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(forthcoming in 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. __ (Nov. 2006)) 
LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ* 
 
Abstract: 
This is a paper about using reputation tracking technologies to displace criminal 
law enforcement and improve the tort system.  The paper contains an extended 
application of this idea to the regulation of motorist behavior in the United States and 
examines the broader case for using technologies that aggregate dispersed information 
in various settings where reputational concerns do not adequately deter antisocial 
behavior. 
The paper begins by exploring the existing data on “How’s My Driving?” 
programs for commercial fleets.  Although more rigorous study is warranted, the initial 
data is quite promising, suggesting that the use of “How’s My Driving?” placards in 
commercial trucks is associated with fleet accident reductions ranging from 20% to 53%.  
The paper then proposes that all vehicles on American roadways be fitted with “How’s 
My Driving?” placards so as to collect some of the millions of daily stranger-on-stranger 
driving observations that presently go to waste.  By delegating traffic regulation to the 
motorists themselves, the state might free up substantial law enforcement resources, 
police more effectively dangerous and annoying forms of driver misconduct that are 
rarely punished, reduce information asymmetries in the insurance market, improve the 
tort system, and alleviate road rage and driver frustration by providing drivers with 
opportunities to engage in measured expressions of displeasure. 
The paper addresses obvious objections to the displacement of criminal traffic 
enforcement with a system of “How’s My Driving?”-based civil fines.  Namely, it 
suggests that by using the sorts of feedback algorithms that eBay and other reputation 
tracking systems have employed, the problems associated with false and malicious 
feedback can be ameliorated.  Indeed, the false feedback problem presently appears more 
soluble in the driving context than it is on eBay.  Driver distraction is another potential 
pitfall, but available technologies can address this problem, and the implementation of a 
“How’s My Driving?” for Everyone system likely would reduce the substantial driver 
distraction that already results from driver frustration and rubbernecking.  The paper 
also addresses the privacy and due process implications of the proposed regime.  It 
concludes by examining various non-driving applications of feedback technologies to 
help regulate the conduct of soldiers, police officers, hotel guests, and participants in 
virtual worlds, among others.           
                                                 
* Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School.  The author thanks Michael Abramowicz, 
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Harnessing the knowledge created by technologies that aggregate dispersed 
information has become a central concern of legal academics, economists, and 
policymakers in the new millennium.  Some academic work has focused on information 
aggregators like Wikipedia, an online encyclopedia that anyone can contribute to, which 
is more extensive than Britannica and nearly as accurate.1  Others have explored the 
virtues of information markets, which seem capable of predicting future events with 
greater accuracy than any assembled group of experts.2  Still more academic work 
examines the growing importance of open source collaboration and peer production of 
intellectual property, where thousands of computer programmers scattered around the 
world team up to produce better code and then disperse immediately thereafter.3  
Simultaneously, many economists have explored eBay’s extraordinarily successful 
system for aggregating and displaying reputation information for millions of unique 
users.4  And organizational theorists have proselytized on behalf of various knowledge 
transfer strategies that improve performance in those companies and agencies that best 
facilitate the efficient flow of information up and down the chain of command.5   
                                                 
1 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE ch. 5 
(forthcoming Oxford Univ. Press 2006) (describing the benefits of Wikipedia and other resources for 
aggregating dispersed information); Jim Giles, Internet Encyclopaedias Go Head to Head: Jimmy Wales’ 
Wikipedia Comes Close to Britannica in Terms of the Accuracy of Its Science Entries, a Nature 
Investigation Finds, 4381 NATURE 900, 900-01 (2005). 
2 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at ch. 4; Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, 
Administrative Decisionmaking, and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 933 (2004); 
Michael Abramowicz, The Law-and-Markets Movement, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 327 (1999); Saul Levmore, 
Simply Efficient Markets and the Role of Regulation: Lessons from the Iowa Electronic Markets and the 
Hollywood Stock Exchange, 28 J. CORP. L. 589 (2003); Charles R. Plott, Markets as Information Gathering 
Tools, 67 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 1 (2000); Charles R. Plott et al., Parimutuel Betting Markets as Information 
Aggregation Devices, 22 ECON. THEORY 311 (2003); Cass. R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical 
Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (2005). 
3 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at ch. 4; Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux, and the 
Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002). 
4 See, e.g., Mikhail I. Melnik & James Alm, Does a Seller’s E-Commerce Reputation Matter? 
Evidence from eBay Auctions, 50 J. INDUSTRIAL ECON. 337 (2002); Paul Resnick & Richard Zeckhauser, 
Trust Among Strangers in Internet Transactions: Empirical Analysis of eBay’s Reputation System 3 (NBER 
Workshop Paper 2001); Stephen S. Standifird, Reputation and e-commerce: eBay Auctions and the 
Asymmetrical Impact of Positive and Negative Ratings, 27 J. MGMT. 279 (2001).  
5 See, e.g., Linda Argote & Paul Ingram, Knowledge Transfer: A Basis for Competitive Advantage in 
Firms, 82 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUMAN PROCESSES 150 (2000); Bradley C. Karkkainen, 
Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New 
Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001); Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, Motivation, Knowledge Transfer, 
and Organizational Forms, 11 ORGANIZATION SCI. 538 (2000); Jeremy C. Stein, Information Production 
and Capital Allocation: Decentralized Versus Hierarchical Firms, 57 J. FINANCE 1891 (2002). 
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This paper takes the next step in the aggregation of dispersed information 
literature.  Namely, it explores using information aggregation technologies to deter, 
detect, and punish citizen misconduct.  This paper will propose that we do exactly that, 
focusing on the most promising and significant application of this approach to law 
enforcement: traffic regulation. 
 The stakes associated with the problem of traffic accidents and commuting-related 
stresses are enormous.  Vehicular collisions are the leading killer of Americans aged 15 
to 29,6 and the nation’s fourth most important cause of lost disability adjusted life years.7  
Worldwide, traffic accidents kill nearly 1.2 million people annually.8  Recent economic 
research has placed commuting at the very bottom of the happiness index, easily ranking 
as the least pleasurable major life activity in which Americans engage.9  Despite this, the 
average American worker spends more than 48 miserable minutes a day commuting to 
and from work,10 completely frustrated by his inability to do anything about the relatively 
small number of obnoxious drivers who are imposing substantial costs on everybody else.   
There is, in short, far more blood on the pavement in the realm of traffic law than 
there can ever be from intellectual property law, corporate law, or e-commerce.  Yet 
while scholars in those fields have begun showing how aggregated information can be 
harnessed to improve laws and lives, scholars interested in transportation policy have 
virtually ignored these insights.11  That blind spot is surprising, given that the dispersed 
                                                 
6 Michael Sivak, How Common Sense Fails Us on the Road: Contribution of Bounded Rationality to 
the Annual Worldwide Toll of One Million Traffic Fatalities, TRANSP. RESEARCH PART F 259, 260 (2002); 
Reginald G. Smart & Robert E. Mann, Commentary: Is Road Rage a Serious Traffic Problem?, 3 TRAFFIC 
INJURY PREVENTION 183, 187 (2002). 
7 Sivak, supra note 6, at 260.  For an exploration of the social costs of traffic fatalities, see Gunnar 
Lindberg, Traffic Insurance and Accident Externality Charges, 35 J. TRANSPORT ECON. & POL’Y 399, 414 
(2001) (estimating that the total social costs of traffic accidents in Sweden is equal to 2.7% of that nation’s 
gross domestic product).  
8 For these statistic, see MARGIE PEDEN, THE WORLD REPORT ON ROAD TRAFFIC INJURY PREVENTION: 
GETTING PUBLIC HEALTH TO DO MORE 3 (Road Safety Congress 2005).   
9 Daniel Kahneman et al., A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experience: The Day 
Reconstruction Method, 306 SCIENCE 1776, 1777 tbl. 1 (2004). 
10 See http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/american_community_survey_acs/ 
004489.html.  This data includes all Americans who work outside their homes.  The average two-way 
commutes exceeded one hour per day in New York City, Newark, Chicago, and Riverside, California. 
11 Although a few legal scholars have written in much detail about traffic law, and discussions about 
no-fault accident insurance once attracted some of the academy’s leading scholars, traffic law scholarship is 
presently peripheral in legal academic discourse.  It is not at all clear why that should be so.  Besides the 
enormous number of lives and dollars at stake, traffic law remains the body of law with which ordinary 
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information relevant for transportation regulation purposes is so readily available and can 
be gathered quite inexpensively, yet virtually all of it presently goes to waste.  Were that 
information harnessed, by contrast, it might be used to save thousands of lives and push 
criminal laws to the margins.  In this case, the pertinent dispersed information consists of 
driver reputation scores.   
 Among the various technologies that have facilitated the aggregation of dispersed 
information, eBay’s reputation system may have generated the most global wealth so far.  
We can underscore the importance of eBay’s seller reputation scores by imagining what 
it would be like to buy items on eBay without them.  Buyers would face the constant risk 
that a seller might abscond with the proceeds of a sale, necessitating substantial 
expenditures on escrow services for nearly every transaction.  Even using escrow, there 
would be substantial problems in the absence of  seller reputation rankings.  Some buyers 
would discover after the fact that they had purchased counterfeit, defective, or stolen 
goods, and be left with little recourse tracking down and suing far-flung sellers.  Law 
enforcement authorities might occasionally prosecute the worst offenders for mail fraud 
or trafficking in counterfeit goods, but the vast majority of wrongdoers would escape into 
the ether, taking the money of trusting buyers with them.  As a result, buyers would be 
scared away from dealing with obscure sellers, and the prices paid for goods on eBay 
would drop substantially.12   
 A modern, urban freeway is a lot like eBay without reputation scores.  Most 
drivers on the freeway are reasonably skilled and willing to cooperate conditionally with 
fellow drivers, but there is a sizable minority that imposes substantial costs on other 
drivers, in the form of accidents, delays, stress, incivility, and rising insurance premiums.  
Because enforcement of the traffic laws by police officers is sporadic and often targeted 
toward those offenses that are easiest to prove, as opposed to those that impose the 
greatest harm on motorists, insurance companies face substantial obstacles sorting among 
the good drivers and the bad.  As a result, safe drivers pay higher premiums, and good 
                                                                                                                                                 
Americans interact most frequently, and is the primary locus of citizens’ interactions with the police.  
Moreover, traffic law is the only set of laws about which adult Americans are routinely tested, and is 
probably the body of law best understood by the lay public.   
12 This outcome reflects the “lemons” scenario developed in George A. Akerlof, The Market for 
“Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
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drivers who are part of demographic groups that are accident-prone pay far higher 
premiums than they would if insurance companies had perfect information.   
Just as eBay developed a successful technological solution to the problem of 
online auctions among Internet users, there are sensible and attainable technological 
solutions to the problems created by motorist anonymity.  These technological solutions 
could produce enormous social benefits in the form of lives saved, property damage 
avoided, everyday unhappiness alleviated, road rage mitigated, and law enforcement 
resources redeployed.  An urban freeway contains thousands of motorists who are 
watching their fellow motorists driving well or poorly, and often talking (to themselves or 
passengers) about who is doing what.  Harnessing this dispersed information by using 
available technologies could generate great welfare gains.  Can this information be put to 
use?  It appears so.  The best available evidence suggests that using “How’s My 
Driving?” placards on commercial vehicles substantially improves fleet safety.  This 
paper proposes a massive expansion of these primitive placards with the implementation 
of a novel program called “How’s My Driving?” for Everyone. 
 Part I discusses anonymity’s central role in creating dysfunction on urban, 
suburban, and exurban roadways.  It discusses the existing evidence regarding How’s My 
Driving programs for commercial fleets, all of which suggests that the programs 
substantially reduce vehicular collisions.  Part II makes the case for a universal How’s 
My Driving program, whereby all drivers would be required to participate in a reputation 
monitoring regime.  Such a program would enable society to put scarce law enforcement 
resources to better use, ensure that the forms of motorist misconduct that impose the 
greatest costs on others receive the harshest sanctions, and reduce information 
asymmetries in the insurance market.  It could also make commuting a far less miserable 
experience while reducing road rage.  Part III explores the potential drawbacks associated 
with a mandatory and universal How’s My Driving program.  This Part assesses the 
magnitude of the inaccurate or malicious feedback problem, examines the associated 
driver distraction costs, considers the privacy objections, and compares the effectiveness 
of How’s My Driving feedback to purely automated safe driving technologies.  This Part 
concludes by examining whether a mandatory, universal How’s My Driving scheme is 
preferable to letting the market do as it will.  Part IV discusses the many variations and 
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policy options that would arise if the government did implement a How’s My Driving for 
Everyone regime.  Part V considers the broader theoretical importance of the insights 
derived from this case study by exploring other policy domains in which the approach of 
replacing state policing with reputation tracking and decentralized enforcement could pay 
dividends.  It suggests that How’s My Driving-style regimes have the capacity to displace 
the state’s roles in enacting and enforcing substantive laws.  To that end, it ponders the 
question of when such displacement is appropriate.  A brief conclusion follows in Part 
VI.  
I. Anonymity and Aggressive Driving 
 “Motorist anonymity” arises when another driver observes my behavior but is 
unable to identify me as Lior Strahilevitz, as opposed to, say, some guy in a dark green 
Honda Civic.  The problems associated with urban and suburban driving are, by and 
large, creatures of motorist anonymity.  That statement may seem too bold to readers 
used to hearing about drunken driving, drowsy driving, and road rage.  But a review of 
the literature on driving suggests that these problems stem from roadway anonymity.  If 
society was able to watch all its roadways around the clock, and analyze this data to 
identify problematic motorists immediately and take corrective action, many of the traffic 
accident deaths that occur every year would be averted.     
 The evidence for this linkage between anonymity and aggressive driving is 
reflected in numerous studies, all of which reach essentially the same conclusion.13  
People are more likely to drive aggressively when they can avoid sanctions, but drive 
courteously when the believe they will be accountable for misconduct.  The cleverest of 
these studies find that drivers of convertibles behave more aggressively with their tops up 
than their tops down,14 even though hotter weather is associated with both one’s top 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Ann M. Brewer, Road Rage: What, Who, When, Where, and How?, 20 TRANSPORT REVS. 
49, 55 (2000); Patricia A. Ellison et al., Anonymity and Aggressive Driving Behavior: A Field Study, 10 J. 
OF SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 265, 266-71 (1995); Richard Harding et al., Road Rage and the 
Epidemiology of Violence: Something Old, Something New, 7 STUDIES ON CRIME & CRIME PREVENTION 
221, 235-36 (1998); Rebecca Lawton & Amanda Nutter, A Comparison of Reported Levels and Expression 
of Anger in Everyday and Driving Situations, 93 BRITISH J. OF PSYCH. 407, 408, 420 (2002); Leo Tasca, A 
Review of the Literature on Aggressive Driving Research, working paper available in 
<http://www.aggressive.drivers.com/papers/tasca/tasca.pdf>. 
14 Ellison et al., supra note 13, at 266-71. 
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being down and aggressive driving.15  This observational evidence is consistent with data 
showing that road rage is rare in those areas where roadway anonymity is diminished, 
such as small rural communities,16 and that people drive more aggressively when they are 
driving alone than when there are passengers in their cars.17   
 The linkage between aggressive driving and negative roadway outcomes, such as 
accidents, near misses, high-stress situations, and road rage, is similarly uncontroversial, 
though its magnitude is the subject of some debate.18  In the most extensive literature 
review to date, Galovski, Malta, and Blanchard concluded that “more than 40 years of 
descriptive and experimental research studies have supported a reliable association 
between aggressive driving and increased risk of motor vehicle accidents.”19  According 
to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, aggressive driving causes 
approximately one-third of all motor vehicle accidents in the U.S. and two-thirds of all 
domestic vehicular fatalities.20  Motorists agree that the problem is very serious, with 
                                                 
15 L.F. Lowenstein, Research into Causes and Manifestations of Aggression in Car Driving, 70 POLICE 
J. 263, 265-66 (1997).  In commuting environments where strangers interact face to face, levels of 
cooperation and other-regarding behavior are higher than they are on urban freeways.  See, e.g., Matthew 
L. Fried & Victor J. DeFazio, Territoriality and Boundary Conflicts in the Subway, 37 PSYCH. 47, 55 
(1974) (describing cooperative behavior among subway passengers). 
16 CHRIS S. DULA, VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT OF A DANGEROUS DRIVING SELF-REPORT 
MEASURE, PHD DISSERTATION IN PSYCHOLOGY, VA. POLYTECHNIC INST. 1 (Mar 26, 2003); Harding et al., 
supra note 13, at 225. 
17 T. Rueda-Domingo et al., The Influence of Passengers on the Risk of the Driver Causing a Car 
Collision in Spain: Analysis of Collisions from 1990 to 1999, 36 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 481, 
486 (2004); David Shinar & Richard Compton, Aggressive Driving : An Observation Study of Driver, 
Vehicle, and Situational Variables, 36 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION 429, 433 (2004). 
18 Jerry L. Deffenbacker et al., Development of a Driving Anger Scale, 74 PSYCH. REPORTS 83, 84 
(1994); Frank A. Drews et al., On the Fast Lane to Road Rage, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND 
INTERNATIONAL DRIVING SYMPOSIUM ON HUMAN FACTORS IN DRIVER ASSESSMENT, TRAINING AND 
VEHICLE DESIGN 1 (2003); Reginald G. Smart et al, Can We Design Cars to Prevent Road Rage?, 1 INT. J. 
VEHICLE INFORMATION & COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 44, 46 (2005); Tasca, supra note 13, at 3; see also 
Elizabeth M. Grey et al., Driver Aggression: The Role of Personality, Social Characteristics, Risk and 
Motivation 49 (Federal Office of Road Safety Report No. CR 81 March 1989) (noting that the most 
accident-free drivers tend to be compulsively non-aggressive); Louis Tijerina, Issues in the Evaluation of 
Driver Distraction Associated with In-Vehicle Information and Telecommunications Systems 6, available in 
<http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/departments/nrd-13/driver-distraction/PDF/3.PDF> (discussing the 
connection between tailgating and crashes). 
19 TARA E. GALOVSKI ET AL., ROAD RAGE: ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF THE ANGRY, AGGRESSIVE 
DRIVER 13 (2006).  The source uses “MVA” as the abbreviation for “motor vehicle accidents,” and the text 
above has been changed to use the unabbreviated term. 
20 Prepared Statement of the Honorable Ricardo Martinez, Administrator, National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Surface 
Transportation Subcommittee (July 17, 1997). 
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survey results showing that aggressive driving is three-and-a-half times more likely than 
drunk driving to be identified as the most pressing traffic safety problem.21 
 So far, our story is straightforward.  People are prone to aggressive driving when 
they feel that anonymity shields them from liability or social sanctions.  This aggressive 
driving, in turn, causes substantial traffic accidents and fatalities.  But that is not the only 
connection between roadway anonymity and adverse traffic outcomes.  A study by 
Harding et al. presents the most comprehensive account of the psychology of aggressive 
driving.  The authors make a convincing case that aggressive behavior by anonymous 
drivers triggers further aggression by those around them, who wish to sanction violations 
of driving norms but feel powerless to do so in light of the anonymity of the norm 
violators.22  That is, many motorists who witness bad driving or aggressive driving 
become frustrated by their inability to sanction the offending motorists, and, as a result, 
they often engage in retaliatory aggressive driving or, worse yet, extreme acts of 
felonious road rage.23  This research suggests that the absence of a measured social 
sanction for roadway norm violations can prompt extreme overreactions.  Many 
aggressive drivers, on this account, are driving aggressively in an attempt “to 
communicate to other road users that there are angry.”24  Yet the nature of roadway 
interactions makes it difficult to express this anger in a proportional way and even more 
difficult for offending drivers to express remorse unambiguously.  In light of this data, we 
should expect to see programs that reduce roadway anonymity substantially decreasing 
aggressive driving and vehicular collusions.  The best available data from the most 
prominent such program strongly supports that hypothesis. 
                                                 
21 Shinar & Compton, supra note 17, at 429. 
22 Harding et al., supra note 13, at 222-31. 
23 Id.; see also Raymond W. Novaco, Automobile Driving and Aggressive Behavior 20 (University of 
California Transp. Ctr. Working Paper No. 42 July 1991) (noting that aggressive driving and pursuit are a 
common response, especially among males, when other motorists drive in an annoying manner); Sheila 
Sarkar et al., Spatial and Temporal Analyses of the Variations in Aggressive Driving and Road Rage 
Behaviors Observed and Reported on San Diego Freeways 6 (Calif. Instit. Transp. Safety Working Paper 
2000) (arguing that road rage can result from retaliation against inattentive aggressive driving); Smart et al., 
supra note 18, at 47 (stating that obscene gestures or verbal abuse are precipitating factors in 64% of road 
rage cases). 
24 Lawton & Nutter, supra note 13, at 407. 
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A. “How’s My Driving?” for Commercial Fleets 
 It is likely that readers of this paper have seen bumper stickers or placards 
emblazoned on the back of commercial trucks, vans, and busses asking the question: 
“How’s My Driving?  Call 1-800-XXX-XXXX with compliments or complaints.”  
Motorists dial these phone numbers, typically using cellular phones, to report good or bad 
behavior by commercial drivers.  The driver monitoring companies then make a report of 
each incident, including details about the reporter’s identity, the road conditions, and the 
details of the incident.  This data is immediately provided to the fleet operator, which 
usually investigates each incident, tracks reports about each driver, and conducts training 
sessions to correct recurring problems or sanctions repeat offenders where appropriate.25 
 In recent years, companies that operate How’s My Driving (“HMD”) programs 
have expanded their operations substantially.26  This expansion has been fueled by 
various studies, mainly conducted by insurance companies, showing that the 
implementation of HMD placards, along with systems for monitoring the performance of 
individual drivers and investigating complaints, engender substantial reductions in 
accidents and losses.  Reviewing these studies, Knipling et al. reported:  
Several studies, mostly by insurance providers, have researched the efficacy of using 
safety placards, such as “How’s My Driving” stickers in improving safety in CMVs.  
These studies have shown significant reductions in vehicle crashes, insurance 
premiums, and DOT reportable crashes when fleets used safety placards with an 
effective feedback loop, that is, feedback combined with training and instruction. 
(Johnson 1998, The Fund 1999; STN 1999; Driver’s Alert 2002).  For example, the 
Hanover Insurance Co. conducted a study with 11 different trucking fleets (n = 445 
trucks) using “How’s My Driving” safety placards and reported a 22% reduction in 
crash rate and a 52% reduction in crash costs after 1 year.”27 
                                                 
25 RONALD R. KNIPLING ET AL., COMMERCIAL TRUCK AND BUS SAFETY: EFFECTIVE COMMERCIAL 
TRUCK AND BUS SAFETY MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUE: A SYNTHESIS OF SAFETY PRACTICE § 4.7 (2003). 
26 Trebor Banstetter, How’s My Driving Calls Keep Truckers in Line, Studies Say, PALM BEACH POST, 
April 20, 1999, at 1A. 
27 KNIPLING ET AL., supra note 25, at § 5.3.4; see also Jim Emerson, Driving Test: Hanover Ins. Co. 
Uses Teleservices Monitoring to Cut Insurance Losses, DIRECT, Feb. 1, 1999, at T3, available in 1999 
WLNR 5531465 (reporting results from the same Hanover study). 
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Other insurance company analyses, reported in press accounts, have found similarly 
substantial benefits from HMD, with Reliance Insurance Company finding that the 
implementation of HMD placards was associated with a 35% reduction in crash costs in 
the first year,28 and Fireman’s Fund Insurance finding a 20% reduction in accidents.29  
Unpublished insurance company studies, supplied to the author by Driver’s Alert, a major 
player in the HMD market, suggested similar results: A Great West Casualty Company 
study of 78 trucking companies found that in the two years after they implemented HMD 
programs, loss ratios improved by 51%, and accident frequency dropped by 53%.30  John 
Deere Transportation Insurance’s study of 63 companies found a 45% decline in loss 
ratio and a 33% decline in accidents.31  Other fleets instituting HMD programs have seen 
similar improvements.32  Insurance studies of the installation of electronic monitoring 
“black boxes” in commercial fleets and passenger vehicles have produced, by contrast, 
20% reductions in accidents.33  
 These results are striking, suggesting that existing HMD programs may result in 
large cost savings and prevent many injuries and deaths.  That said, to the best of my 
knowledge, no study of the effectiveness of HMD programs has ever appeared in a peer-
reviewed journal.  This dearth of peer reviewed studies should prompt caution, in part 
because it would be useful to know whether the insurance industry studies adequately 
accounted for selection effects.34  The results of a survey suggesting that many 
commercial fleet safety managers were not enamored with the effectiveness HMD 
programs might prompt further skepticism, although there were real survey design 
                                                 
28 Banstetter, supra note 26, at 1A. 
29 Deb Riechmann, Firms Get Good Mileage out of “How’s My Driving?”, PHILA. INQUIRER C1 (Mar. 
26, 1999). 
30 DRIVER’S ALERT: A VEHICLE SAFETY & INFORMATION SERVICE (unpaginated manuscript, on file 
with author). 
31 Id. 
32 See, e.g., Joey Ledford, How’s My Driving? Draws a Response, ATLANTA J. & CONST. B5 (Dec. 24, 
2001); How’s My Driving? Helps Firms Slash Accident Rates, FLEET NEWS, July 3, 1998, at 32, available 
in 1998 WLNR 5732045. 
33 MATTHIAS ROETTING ET AL., TRUCK DRIVERS’ ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS 4 (Liberty Mutual 
Research Instit. for Safety 2004); Peter I.J. Wouters & John M.J. Bos, Traffic Accident Reduction by 
Monitoring Driver Behaviour with In-Car Data Recorders, 32 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 643, 
649 (2000). 
34 More specifically, it may be that companies sign up for HMD programs when they are also 
implementing other beneficial safety measures, or that they are likely to sign up form HMD programs after 
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problems with this portion of the survey, which may explain that result.35  On the other 
hand, those intrigued by the data presented above can take comfort that all the available 
studies point in the same direction, that some sophisticated insurance companies are 
willing to put their money where their mouths are by providing discounts to commercial 
fleets that implement HMD programs,36 and that the market for HMD services has grown 
dramatically in the last few years, both in the U.S. and abroad.37  In short, an increasing 
number of businesses have been betting big on this technology in recent years, and seem 
pleased with their investment.  At the end of the day, then, there is reasonably strong 
evidence that HMD programs produce substantial improvements in fleet safety, and the 
evidence is certainly strong enough to warrant rigorous investigation by transportation 
scholars. 
 Let us assume that the existing data reveals a causal effect, and that HMD 
programs do reduce collisions and collision-related losses.  To what can we attribute 
these improvements in fleet safety?  There appear to be two mechanisms at play.  First, 
the presence of these placards reminds commercial fleet drivers that they are accountable 
                                                                                                                                                 
incurring unusually large losses from accidents during a particular year and that the HMD improvements 
reflect regression to the mean. 
35 Whereas many safety coordinators at commercial trucking companies did not rank “How’s My 
Driving placards and 800 numbers” highly as an effective safety strategy, they ranked “continuous tracking 
of driver’s crashes/incidents/violations” as the third most important safety strategy (among 28 strategies).  
KNIPLING ET AL., supra note 25, at 2.2.1 tbl. 1 & tbl. 2.  Tracking crashes and violations is relatively easy 
for commercial fleets, but if “incidents” refers to something other than “crashes” and “violations” then the 
only way to track such “incidents” would be through driver reports or motorist reports obtained from HMD.  
Indeed, all HMD service providers provide both a toll-free hotline and detailed incident reports and 
tracking reports for particular drivers.  It therefore seems likely that the survey designers’ decision to 
disaggregate HMD placards from “continuous tracking” of driver conduct resulted in the former being 
ranked as less effective.  Knipling et al. themselves echo a similar concern, noting forthrightly the puzzling 
fact that “safety managers and other experts rated the practice of crash, incident, and violation tracking as 
highly effective . . . but they did not highly value the monitoring of source safety behaviors creating these 
outcomes.”  Id. at § 5.3.5.  An alternative explanation for the poor performance of HMD placards in the 
Knipling survey is that fleet safety managers are almost always former truck drivers, id. at § 2.1, and 
survey research reveals that truck drivers are typically hostile to receiving motorist feedback via HMD 
numbers, though they generally welcome feedback from fellow truckers and their safety supervisors.  
ROETTING ET AL., supra note 33, at 9; Yueng-Hsiang Huang et al., In Vehicle Safety Feedback, 
PROFESSIONAL SAFETY 20, 24 tbl. 3, 27 (Jan. 2005). 
36 Riechmann, supra note 29, at C1; see also State Encounters Problem with Plan for “How’s My 
Driving?” Stickers, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL, Sep. 29, 2004, at 5A (noting that a 2002 study 
by the South Carolina Governor’s Office of Fiscal Risk Analysis and Management predicted that the state 
government would save $2.5 million annually by placing HMD stickers on all state vehicles). 
37 See, e.g., How’s My Driving?, Nov. 2, 2005, at http://irishtrucker.com/articles/2004/april/hmd.asp 
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for behavior that is likely to annoy fellow motorists.38  Being watched acts as a deterrent 
to bad acts.  Second, the information obtained from HMD calls allows commercial fleets 
to identify the worst drivers for extra training or dismissal.39  Typically, 80% of fleet 
drivers rarely receive complaints, and 10-20% receive complaints frequently.40  This data 
is consistent with other industry data showing that at most commercial trucking firms 
studied, the worst 10-20% of drivers are responsible for the majority of all collisions.41  It 
is also worth noting that the nature of the complaints logged by HMD companies 
suggests that motorists generally call to complain about driving behaviors that are 
particularly likely to lead to accidents.  Driver’s Alert data classifies all its calls into one 
of the following categories, and reports the frequency of calls as follows: “Speeding 
(21%); tailgating (11%); unsafe lane change (23%); Illegal Passing (4%); Failure to Yield 
(5%); Failure to Stop (6%); Illegal Parking (2%); Compliment (8%); Weaving (15%); 
Miscellaneous (5%).”42  If most of these reports are truthful, then it is no wonder that 
commercial fleet managers are able to use HMD data to identify the most accident-prone 
drivers.43 
B. The Expansion of “How’s My Driving?” Programs to Automobiles 
 HMD programs began in the 1980s as a system for reducing commercial fleet 
crashes.44  During the 1990s and in this decade, several companies began targeting a 
second market niche: passenger vehicles driven by teenagers.45  The idea here is basically 
the same as in the commercial context.  Vehicular collisions are the leading cause of 
                                                 
38 KNIPLING ET AL., supra note 25, at § 4.7. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at § 5.3.4.; Emerson, supra note 27, at T3; see also Riechmann, supra note 29, at C1.  (“More 
than 90 percent of the drivers are never targets of a complaint, said FleetSafe president Richard Lea.”). 
41 KNIPLING ET AL., supra note 25, at § 5.2.1.; see also Riechmann, supra note 29, at C1 (asserting that 
“ninety percent of the incidents are caused by only 10 percent of the drivers”). 
42 DRIVER’S ALERT, supra note 30; see also Emerson, supra note 27, at T3 (stating that the most 
common complaints to HMD call centers “include tailgating, running red lights, speeding, improper lane 
changes, and cutting off other drivers”). 
43 Truckers Turn Toward Safety When Being Monitored, J. COMMERCE 12A (Nov. 16, 1998) (“Most 
commercial drivers are good drivers, but about 10 percent to 15 percent drive aggressively  -- tailgating, 
weaving in and out of traffic, and speeding . . . That kind of driving causes severe crashes.  And it’s also the 
kind of driving that gets people annoyed enough to call the 800 number on the sticker.”). 
44 Ledford, supra note 32, at B5. 
45 Rex Bowman, Roanoke, Va., Business Lets Drivers Call in to Monitor Teen Performance, 
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 2, 2000; Michael Squires, New Program to Help Parents Monitor Their 
Teenage Drivers, LAS VEGAS REV. J. 2B (Jan. 19, 2003); Lynn Waddell, Teen Driving: I’m Gonna Go Tell 
Mom!, NEWSWEEK, May 10, 2004, at 9. 
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death for American youths.46  Little wonder, then, that parents worry about their 
children’s safety and the safety of nearby motorists and pedestrians.  Under HMD-for-
teens programs, placards and bumper stickers are installed on the teenagers’ cars, and all 
incident reports are conveyed directly to the parents.  So far, it does not appear that the 
effectiveness of these programs has been studied, although there is little reason to expect 
that the results would be much different from those associated with commercial fleet 
HMD programs.47  HMD programs for teens elicit information that supplements accident 
reports and tickets.  Parents of teens with “clean” driving records report receiving valid 
critical feedback through HMD stickers, which they then use to take corrective action.48     
C. Inadequacies of Existing HMD Programs  
 The apparent effectiveness of HMD programs is rather surprising in light of the 
following fact: Complaints flow into HMD call centers at an unimpressive rate.  For 
example, HMD decals on 3,000 Sysco trucks prompted only 435 incident reports to the 
HMD call center during 1998.49  Data provided to the author by Driver’s Alert revealed 
higher call volumes: 283 calls in a six month period for Sonic Express’s 1330 vehicles in 
1999; 15 calls in the same period for Northern Beverage’s 98 vehicles; and, at the high 
end, 23 calls during the six-month period for Mass Construction’s 20 vehicles.50  Yet 
despite these rather low call volumes, insurance studies conducted during this era still 
showed that HMD programs resulted in substantial reductions in accidents and losses. 
 This relative dearth of calls is not entirely surprising, given that reports to HMD 
call centers are something of a public good.  Drivers have virtually no economic 
incentive to complain about commercial fleet drivers whose vehicles sport HMD 
                                                 
46 Smart & Mann, supra note 6, at 187. 
47 Where HMD programs have achieved little market penetration, commercial and non-commercial 
drivers evidently engage in aggressive driving at approximately the same rates.  Shinar & Compton, supra 
note 17, at 434.  Shinar and Compton reached this conclusion on the basis of a large-scale observational 
study near Tel Aviv prior to 2003.  Id. at 429, 430.  “How’s My Driving?” stickers first appeared on Israeli 
trucks and busses during 2005.  Barry Newman, Steering Committee, JERUSALEM POST 4 (Dec. 8, 2005).  
Parents may have fewer driver training resources at their disposal than commercial fleet companies, but 
they also have few drivers to monitor, and might limit or revoke the driving privileges of teenagers whose 
actions generate complaints, while rewarding those whose call logs suggest they are good drivers.  
Bowman, supra note 45.   
48 Jean Nash Johnson, Moms Make a Web Site to Monitor Teen Drivers, ATLANTIC CITY PRESS, July 
31, 2005, at G1. 
49 Riechmann, supra note 29, at C1. 
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placards, and incur some costs when doing so, in the form of cell phone airtime charges 
and an increased risk of a collision while reaching for the phone or a pen to facilitate an 
HMD report.  Using a simplistic model of homo economicus, the question is why anyone 
bothers to contribute to this public good when doing so is costly.51 
 The same question can be asked in the eBay context, as well as in the context of 
services like Wikipedia, CNET.com, Amazon’s product ratings, the Zagat Guide, 
Download.com, and Tripadvisor.com.  Yet in all those contexts, an extraordinarily 
valuable public good has arisen based on the voluntary contribution of feedback from 
mostly anonymous or pseudonymous users.  A recent study of Wikipedia, published in 
Nature, found Wikipedia entries on science matters to be roughly as accurate as 
Encyclopaedia Britannica’s.52  EBay is the online forum that attracts the greatest level of 
participation, with feedback provided by users in half of all transactions.53  These 
feedback levels are high even though transaction partners do not expect to, and probably 
will not, engage in future transactions,54 and even though a buyer whose seller has 
already provided favorable feedback has no incentive to provide feedback about the 
seller.55  Not coincidentally, eBay is also the service where users face the lowest costs of 
providing feedback.  Indeed, eBay’s software encourages users to leave feedback by 
reminding them of the opportunity to do so after a transaction has been completed.  The 
incentive to provide feedback is cast in various ways: as a civic duty, an act of 
reciprocity, a common courtesy, or a chance to reward good conduct and avenge 
misconduct.56  Though eBay’s reputation system is admittedly imperfect, it has been 
extraordinarily successful at preventing fraud among auction participants.57 
                                                                                                                                                 
50 Driver’s Alert, supra note 30, Fleet Profile, at 1. 
51 Asking and answering these questions is a theme in some of my other work.  See, e.g., Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping 
Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505 (2003) (examining users’ willingness to upload content on P2P file-
swapping networks). 
52 Giles, supra note 1, at 900-01. 
53 Paul Resnick & Richard Zeckhauser, Trust Among Strangers in Internet Transactions: Empirical 
Analysis of eBay’s Reputation System 3 (NBER Workshop Paper 2001). 
54 Id. at 9. 
55 Id. at 20. 
56 Id. at 5. 
57 Nolan Miller, Eliciting Honest Feedback in Electronic Markets 3 (John F. Kennedy School of 
Government Faculty Research Working Paper RWP02-039 August 2002); Rong Ruey Duh et al., Control 
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 Robert Frank has suggested that an emotional desire for vengeance often 
motivates people to sanction those whose misbehavior imposes costs on others.58  If we 
examine the nature of calls to HMD services, it appears that this desire for vengeance and 
concern for personal and community safety are the primary factors motivating individuals 
to call in complaints.59  We know from a study of San Diego’s freeways that motorists do 
call the police in nontrivial numbers to complain about fellow motorists’ aggressive 
driving, despite the absence of an organized program to encourage such calls and the 
nonexistence of an organized effort by law enforcement to respond to these calls in a 
timely manner.60  And when Maryland instituted a 1997 campaign asking motorists who 
observed aggressive driving to inform the state police by dialing #77 on their cell phones, 
the line received as many as 200 calls a day.61  Yet when police receive reports of 
aggressive driving, they do not usually issue a citation unless they can intercept the 
vehicle that sparked the complaint and observe unlawful conduct.62  It is also worth 
noting that unlike eBay, which exhibits a “Pollyanna effect,” whereby feedback is overly 
positive,63 HMD services elicit responses that are overwhelmingly negative.64  The lesson 
here is that when it comes to driving, some people do gain welfare from sanctioning a 
misbehaving driver by reporting the misconduct to a 1-800 number.  We can expect that 
when the costs of tattling fall, the quantity of tattling will rise.     
                                                                                                                                                 
and Assurance in E-Commerce: Privacy, Integrity, and  Security at eBay, 3 TAIWAN ACCOUNTING REV. 1, 
15 (2002). 
58 ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS 53 (1988). 
59 See supra text accompanying note 42.  Because of this dynamic, whereby people obtain utility by 
sanctioning those who engage in antisocial behavior, the methodological challenges that arise when surveys 
and other instruments attempt to elicit accurate information from respondents are mitigated.  For 
discussions of some of these challenges in the survey context, see Tomas Philipson, Data Markets and the 
Production of Surveys, 64 REV. ECON. STUDIES 47, 60-67, 70-71 (1997) 47-73; Tomas Philipson & Anup 
Malani, Measurement Errors: A Principal Investigator-Agent Approach, 91 J. ECONOMETRICS 273, 280-96 
(1999). 
60 Sarkar et al., supra note 23, at 2.  The Sarkar study found that during a 3-month period in which the 
California Highway Patrol tracked calls related to aggressive driving on San Diego freeways, it logged 
2000 such calls.  Id.  Ten percent of survey respondents in the same study reported that they have called the 
police on their cell phones to report aggressive drivers in the past.  Id. at 18.  
61 Kevin Johnson, Frustration Drives Road Rage, TRAFFIC SAFETY 8, 10 (July/August 1997).  
62 Michael Miller, How’s My Driving? Behavior Can Impact Business Image, SOUTH FLA. BUS. J., 
Dec. 14, 2001, available at <http://www.bizjournals.com/southflorida/stories/2001/12/17/story4.html>. 
63 Resnick & Zeckhauser, supra note 53, at 11.  For a description of the Pollyanna effect, see infra text 
accompanying note 203. 
64 See supra text accompanying note 42. 
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 Of course, the costs of tattling are falling, substantially.  In the past decade, the 
number of Americans who own cell phones has skyrocketed,65 as has the prevalence of 
cell phone use by motorists.66  One would predict that the increased availability of cell 
phones has resulted in increased call volumes to HMD call centers, although in the last 
couple of years some states have tried to curtail driver distraction by mandating the use of 
hands-free devices.67  The hypothesis put forward to explain the HMD program’s 
effectiveness – that it deters bad driving and allows firms to target the worst drivers for 
training and/or dismissal – suggests that as call volumes increase, the effectiveness of 
these programs also increases.   
 I shall conclude this portion of the argument with what I regard as a critical fact 
that supports the hypothesis that there is a great deal of additional information about 
individual drivers that currently goes to waste.  It comes from an ingenious experiment 
run by Andrew McGarver and Michelle Steiner.68  McGarver and Steiner set up a 
controlled experiment whereby subjects, driving their own motor vehicles, believed their 
speed and distance perception were being evaluated by a researcher sitting in the 
passenger seat.69  In fact, the questions the researcher asked each subject were a ruse, 
designed to distract the subject from the actual experimental stimulus.  After several 
blocks, the subject’s vehicle approached a stop sign, at which point the researcher 
hesitated to provide directions about how to proceed.  In the mean time, a confederate 
driver approached the back of the vehicle, and began honking his horn.70  The 
experimenter then measured the subject’s response to this aggressive act, which was 
followed by the confederate’s vehicle rapidly passing the subject’s vehicle soon after the 
subject had made a right turn at the stop sign.  McGarver and Steiner found that three-
                                                 
65 See U.S. Cell Phone Use Up More than 300 Percent, Statistical Abstract Reports, available in 
<http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/miscellaneous/003136.html> (reporting that 
the number of cell phones in the United States increased from 34 million in 1995 to 159 million in 2003). 
66 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., CELL 
PHONE USE ON THE ROADS IN 2002, at 7 fig. 4 (National Ctr. for Statistics & Analysis Sep. 2005) 
(estimating that between 2000 and 2002, the number of drivers using cell phones at any given time between 
8am and 6 pm, in the United States increased from 501,593 to 850,753). 
67 Melissa A. Savage et al., Traffic Safety and Public Health: State Legislative Action 2004, at 10 
(National Conf. of State Legislatures Dec. 2004 report No. 20). 
68 Andrew R. McGarva & Michelle Steiner, Provoked Driver Aggression and Status : A Field Study, 3 
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART F 167 (2000). 
69 Id. at 172. 
70 Id. 
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quarters of all subjects verbalized a negative response to this provocation.71  “In the 
majority of cases, angered participants made negative statements about the other driver, 
such as ‘what a jerk!’ or ‘this guy behind me is really ticked off!’ as well as some 
common expletives.”72  This data suggests that drivers’ verbal responses to aggressive 
driving are often essentially automatic.  It is buttressed by survey research finding that 
sizable majorities of drivers admit that while driving alone they complain aloud about the 
conduct of their fellow drivers.73  Sometimes, frustrated drivers feel the need to vent by 
saying something derogatory to the source of their frustration, and this venting can 
escalate existing roadway conflicts.74     
 To recap, people are already complaining to themselves about aggressive 
drivers.75  People are complaining to their passengers as well.76  And some people are 
complaining to the government even when not prompted to do so.77  If only we could 
develop a system that harnessed these complaints without imposing a burden on drivers 
to reach for a cell phone, call an HMD number, and report the details to an operator, an 
enormous amount of additional evidence would be revealed about the identities of 
aggressive drivers.  The public goods problem would essentially dissipate if McGarver 
and Steiner’s result is generalizable.78 
 So let us survey this terrain.  HMD placards generate rather modest per-vehicle 
call volumes, and these occasional calls are evidently sufficient to improve commercial 
fleets’ safety performance through some combination of deterring aggressive driving and 
allowing firms to identify their worst drivers in an expeditious manner.  These placards 
were apparently successful even in an era in which cellular phones were far less prevalent 
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73 Dula, supra note 16, at 6. 
74 Jacob L. Cayanus et al., The Relationships between Driver Anger and Aggressive Communication 
Traits, 22 COMMUNICATION RESEARCH REPORTS 189, 194-95 (2005). 
75 See supra text accompanying notes 71-72. 
76 See supra text accompanying note 73. 
77 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
78  It is possible that drivers are more likely to complain about an aggressive driver if there is a 
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than they are today, and even though there are monetary and safety costs associated with 
reporting a driver’s misconduct to an HMD call center.  It stands to reason that by 
lowering the costs of reporting driver misconduct further, HMD systems could do a much 
better job of identifying the worst drivers.  The next section sketches out such a system. 
D. “How’s My Driving?” for Everyone 
 HMD placards, which began with commercial fleets, are now migrating toward 
non-commercial vehicles driven by teens.  Georgia required all state-owned vehicles, 
with the exception of police cars, to display HMD placards in June of 2005.79  That same 
year, Israel became the first nation to mandate the display of HMD placards on all 
commercial vehicles.80  This expansion of HMD raises the question: Why stop there?  
Why not, rather, expand HMD programs to include all motor vehicles driven in the 
United States and install in each vehicle a voice activated device that facilitates the 
reporting and tracking of motorist misconduct?81 
 Just as each new motor vehicle is required to have seat belts in order to be road 
legal on Interstate highways,82 the federal government could mandate the installation of 
HMD placards or bumper stickers on the front and rear of each passenger vehicle in the 
United States.  Each placard would provide a unique identifier for each vehicle.83  By 
pressing a button on their dashboards and speaking into a steering-wheel-mounted 
speaker, motorists would be able to contact a national HMD call center, and provide the 
                                                                                                                                                 
when driving alone as when driving with others.  See Dula, supra note 16, at 6 (reporting a survey finding 
that “77% of men and 56% of women swear underneath their breath at other drivers”). 
79 See <http://www.fleet-central.com/gf/t_inside.cfm?action=news_pick&storyID=19805> (visited 
Feb. 17, 2006). 
80 Newman, supra note 47, at 4. 
81 As best I can tell, this idea was first proposed publicly in a short post by a pseudonymous blogger in 
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derived data by insurers, and suggested that eliminating anonymity among drivers would improve motorist 
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82 See Brian T. Bagley, Comment, The Seat Belt Defense in Texas, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 707, 718 
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to complain about Maryland FGE 344, but instead identifies the plate as Virginia FGE 344).  HMD 
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vehicle’s unique identifier to an operator in order to lodge compliments or complaints.84  
The law would require the illumination of the placard at night and mandate its visibility 
whenever the vehicle was moving.  Law enforcement officials would be able to use the 
unique identifiers as well, to gauge instantly whether a particular vehicle’s liability 
insurance was valid, after accessing a centralized registry. 
 For reasons that will be discussed in Part IV, it may well be the case that an 
optimal HMDFE would make use of additional new technologies, beyond placards and 
call centers.  A more expensive system would use in-vehicle GPS technologies or cell 
phone triangulation to enable reporting without resort to a unique identifier, along the 
lines of “Red Toyota behind me, subtract 2 points,” which would lower the driver 
distraction costs of reporting even further and possibly reduce the probability of 
erroneous reports if people misread unique identifiers.  These higher-tech versions of 
HMD are described more fully in Part IV, but for the time being, we can discuss the low-
tech versions currently being managed by Fleetsafe, Driver’s Alert and other HMD 
companies for use in commercial fleets, supplemented by readily available vehicle-
integrated cell phone technologies.85 
 Here is how this low-tech version would work.  Suppose motorist A was driving 
along Interstate 5, and was suddenly cut off by motorist B, who did not signal a lane 
change, and who abruptly hit his brakes, forcing motorist A to brake suddenly.  Under a 
How’s My Driving for Everyone (“HMDFE”) program, motorist A could contact a HMD 
call center, and say the following words: “896JXD402, subtract 1 point, driver cut me off 
without signaling.”  Each motorist would be allotted a particular number of positive and 
negative points that they could dispense to other motorists during a particular month.  
These points could be dispensed one-at-a-time or cumulatively, for extreme acts of 
aggression or kindness.  The call center would then convert the call reports into incident 
data for each vehicle on the road, possibly using automated voice recognition software.86  
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Motorists would receive a monthly or quarterly invoice from the HMDFE monitoring 
center, along with a bill (if negative points on their driving exceeded positive points) or a 
check (if positive points substantially exceeded negative points).  These would be styled 
as civil fines and rewards.87 
Call centers would record the phone number and name of the complainant, though 
this information would not be provided to the motorist whose driving sparked this 
complaint.  HMDFE could be designed as a revenue neutral subsidy from bad drivers to 
good drivers, or, more likely, revenue collected could be used to offset the loss of 
government revenue from speeding tickets and other moving violations.  Reports could 
also be made available to insurers, who would be free to use the data so obtained for 
premium setting purposes.     
 Given the apparent safety improvements associated with HMD programs, we can 
conceptualize HMDFE as a vehicular safety device designed to save lives and dollars.  It 
is a new kind of device, however, one that harnesses the value of dispersed information 
that currently goes to waste.  In the part that follows, I will develop in more detail the 
affirmative case for HMDFE.  A few readers may be chomping at the bit to know how 
HMDFE could cope with false or malicious feedback, driver distraction costs, and other 
likely objections.  These problems turn out to be manageable, though readers will have to 
wait until Part III to hear why that is so. 
II. The Case for “How’s My Driving?” for Everyone 
 There is an easy way of distilling my argument in Part I of this paper, which is 
that a world without HMDFE is like a world in which students evaluate their professors’ 
teaching, but no one ever reads or analyzes these evaluations.  The students are sitting in 
class each day.  They form opinions about the quality of the teaching.  They discuss with 
classmates the quality of the teaching without prompting.  In such a world, someone 
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Confrontation Clause.  See Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1352 (7th Cir. 1997).  As 
explained below, HMDFE permits motorists to penalize those who impose substantial costs on them, with 
the state acting as a clearinghouse that enforces those penalties (and distributes any rewards for courteous 
driving). 
  21
should design a standardized form to solicit feedback and designate a place where 
feedback forms can be deposited and tabulated.  No one is saying student evaluations 
should be the only measure of teaching performance.  But it would be crazy to deny the 
value of collecting and analyzing the data at a school where administrators care about the 
quality of the educational experience.  It is similarly silly to leave professors without the 
accountability that student evaluations provide; many professors would still teach 
conscientiously, but more than a few would not.  Yet in the driving context, the 
government’s policy does nothing to facilitate the collection of this readily available 
feedback, and even when motorists call in to complain about their fellow drivers anyway, 
the government rarely bothers to investigate to see whether the complaints have merit. 
 In this part of the paper, I will suggest ways in which the driving context may be 
particularly well suited to harnessing the value of dispersed information.  In the process, I 
will spend a fair amount of time discussing the criminal law and tort systems, which 
presently regulate traffic in the United States.  In some ways, it is a shame that these two 
legal systems have already occupied this terrain, for HMDFE could prove to be a more 
attractive regulatory regime than either one.  But the existence of these two systems 
hardly eliminates the need for HMDFE.  Rather, we should consider HMDFE as a regime 
that will allow society to substantially improve the performance of its tort system and 
significantly scale back the resources presently devoted to criminal traffic enforcement.  
A. Putting Scarce Law Enforcement Resources to Better Use 
 It is largely because of the absence of an effective HMDFE program or other 
effective reputation tracking regime that society must assign a substantial number of its 
law enforcement resources to policing the roadways.  In state courts, traffic violations 
account for 55 percent of all incoming cases.88  Moreover, when traffic citations are 
issued, and motorists decide to contest their citations, police officers must travel to traffic 
                                                 
88 See National Center for State Courts, 2004 Court Statistics Project: Traffic, available in 
<http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2004_Files/EWTraffic_final_2.pdf> (visited Feb. 17, 2006). 
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court to testify and present evidence,89 which is plainly not the best use of their time, but 
which follows from the criminal nature of traffic penalties.90  
  Needless to say, an HMDFE program would enable the government to redirect 
traffic police to other endeavors where dispersed information aggregation systems would 
be relatively ineffective at policing deviancy and crime.  Alternatively, HMDFE would 
enable state and local governments to shift resources to government programs that further 
other objectives, like health care, education, or military defense.  That is not to say that an 
HMDFE program would allow state and local governments to do away with traffic police 
altogether.  Some police would still be necessary to help direct traffic around collision 
sites; to ensure that drivers did not disable their vehicles’ HMD placards so as to evade 
the HMDFE system; to identify and impound cars driven by uninsured drivers; and 
perhaps to intervene in real time when an extremely reckless motorist’s behavior triggers 
substantial numbers of reports from motorists.   
 Other tasks currently delegated exclusively to traffic police, like writing tickets 
for motorists who drive at excessive speeds or run red lights, could be delegated entirely 
to the HMDFE program.  Indeed, when crashes occur, detailed police reports usually 
would be unnecessary.  HMDFE communications centers could expect to receive several 
contemporaneous reports from other drivers who witnessed the collision, which would 
help resolve blameworthiness in many cases where it might otherwise be contested, and 
which would solve the chronic problem of collision underreporting, which is one of the 
more severe information asymmetries currently faced by automobile insurers. 
B. Optimizing Monitoring of Roadway Violations 
 Police officers are little better than individual motorists in recognizing violations 
of traffic rules – they have tools like radar detectors at their disposal, and perhaps 
                                                 
89 Roger C. Cramton, Driver Behavior and Legal Sanctions: A Study of Deterrence, 67 MICH. L. REV. 
421, 433-34 (1969). 
90 Police time, of course, is not the only scarce resource.  Respect for the police is scarce as well, too 
scarce in many urban environments.  It is common to see motorists cooperating in an effort to thwart police 
enforcement of traffic laws.  For example, motorists often flash their high beam headlights to warn 
oncoming traffic that a radar-gun toting traffic patrol officer is hiding behind the next bend.  In this context, 
motorist cooperation to evade the law may reflect frustration with police enforcement, and that frustration 
may have spillover effects in other contexts where the presence of citizen respect for the police’s law 
enforcement function becomes a life or death matter.  
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somewhat better expertise regarding those rules, but little comparative advantage beyond 
that.  Whatever advantage individual police officers have over individual motorists is 
swamped, however, by two factors.  First, the presence of a marked police car induces 
motorists to change their driving behavior radically, so as to comply with the law.91  
Second, police cruisers are dramatically outnumbered by other vehicles on the roadway.92  
An effective HMDFE program would essentially turn every vehicle into an unmarked 
police car, resulting in substantial reductions in unlawful or inconsiderate driving 
behavior.   
 Beyond their numerical advantage, there are reasons to expect that the quality of 
self-policing by motorists would exceed the quality of governmental policing.  As an 
initial matter it is worth examining the problems associated with the present regime. 
1. Suboptimal Police Monitoring 
The bread and butter of many state and local police departments is writing 
speeding tickets.  Published data on traffic citations issued in the U.S., broken down by 
violation type, is frustratingly rare.  That said, Wisconsin is charmingly meticulous about 
tracking both traffic citations and crashes, and its data suggests that citations issued for 
speeding dramatically outnumber the citations issued for other dangerous driving 
activities.  For example, in 2003, Dane County, Wisconsin issued more than 60 times as 
many speeding citations as tailgating citations.93  Indeed, speeding citations there 
outnumbered the combined citations issued for tailgating, running stop signs, running red 
lights, illegal turns, illegal passing, unsafe backing, unsafe lane deviations, and 
                                                 
91 A.S. Hakkert et al., The Evaluation of Effects on Driver Behavior and Accidents of Concentrated 
General Enforcement on Interurban Roads in Israel, 33 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 43, 59-61 
(2001). 
92 See Cramton, supra note 89, at 435 (“There is so much driving behavior, and it is so dispersed in 
time and space, that traffic police, using present methods of surveillance and enforcement, face a virtually 
insurmountable task.”). 
93 Calculated based on data provided at <http://www.danesheriff.com/03annual/citations.htm>.  In 
Ontario, Canada, speeding accounts for more than half of all traffic convictions. Donald A. Redelmeier et 
al., Traffic-Law Enforcement and Risk of Death from Motor-Vehicle Crashes: A Case-Crossover Study, 361 
LANCET 2177, 2179 (2003).  A survey study of newly licensed teenaged drivers in northeast states found 
that of their first traffic citations, 66% were for speeding, 10% were for running a red light or stop sign, and 
failing to buckle up and making an illegal turn accounted for 4% of citations each.  Anne T. McCartt et al., 
Driving Experience, Crashes, and Traffic Citations of Teenage Beginning Drivers, 35 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 
& PREVENTION 311, 316 (2003).   
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inattentive driving by a factor of 6.6.94  Targeting those who drive at excessive speeds 
may well be the optimal police strategy for raising revenue and minimizing traffic 
contests, because radar guns provide relatively objective evidence of a violations.  Yet 
unless we make a series of unrealistic assumptions about the differential costs of 
speeding and speed-limit-enforcement versus other traffic infractions, it is unlikely that 
this substantial commitment of law enforcement resources to policing speed limits is the 
optimal strategy for improving road safety.95  Wisconsin data, along with recent data 
from other states, suggests that a failure to yield contributes to more vehicle crashes than 
speeding, and tailgating contributes to slightly more accidents as well, although speeding 
does contribute to more fatal crashes.96   
As a result of this emphasis on speeding, other traffic laws go under enforced.  
Survey data reveals that only 6.4% of motorists who admitted to running a red light 
recently have ever been ticketed for the practice, and that motorists are far more likely to 
have been involved in an accident where one motorist ran a red light than they are to have 
received a ticket for running a red light.97  Police officers, in short, seem to be 
overpolicing the motorist misconduct that is easiest to detect and underpolicing the 
misconduct that leads to the most collisions.  Perhaps these distortions explain the 
public’s profound resentment of traffic police, especially among U.S. drivers, who are 
more aggravated by the presence of said police than they are by much of the misconduct 
                                                 
94 Calculated based on data provided at <http://www.danesheriff.com/03annual/citations.htm>. 
95 John J. Bowen, A Driver Looks at Traffic Enforcement, 57 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POL. SCI. 
218, 218 (1966). 
96 See <http://www.dot.wisconsin.gov/safety/motorist/behaviors/aggressive/factors.htm>.  New York’s 
Department of Motor Vehicles reviewed 2003 crash data and concluded that a failure to yield contributed 
to 16% of crashes, tailgating contributed to 14% of crashes, and speeding contributed to 11% of crashes.  
See <http://www.nysgtsc.state.ny.us/hssp-06.htm>.  Oklahoma data from the early 1990s presents similar 
findings, though speeding contributed to slightly more crashes than tailgating and inattention: Failure to 
yield contributed to 19% of crashes, tailgating contributed to 11% of crashes, speeding contributed to 12% 
of crashes, and inattention contributed to 9% of crashes.  Michael J. Goodman et al., Using Cellular 
Telephones in Vehicles: Safe or Unsafe?, 1 TRANSPORTATION HUMAN FACTORS 3 (2000).   
97 Bryan E. Porter & Thomas D. Berry, A Nationwide Survey of Self-Reported Red Light Running: 
Measuring Prevalence, Predictors, and Perceived Consequences, 33 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 
735, 738-39 (2001); see also Dula, supra note 16, at 3 (noting that 61% of survey respondents believe that 
anti-tailgating laws are inadequately enforced); Smart & Mann, supra note 6, at 184 (noting that many 
manifestations of road rage aren’t illegal); How’s Your Driving? – Smart Motorist,  
<http://www.smartmotorist.com/dri/dri.htm> (discussing various types of unsafe driving behaviors that are 
not proscribed by law or for which the relevant traffic laws are under enforced).   
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that these police are supposed to deter.98  In the minds of many drivers, the cure for most 
unlawful driving is worse than the disease.   
An additional shortcoming associated with primary police enforcement of traffic 
rules involves the entirely punitive nature of police regulation.  That is to say, police 
officers focus almost exclusively on punishing poor driving, and do nothing to reward 
good driving.  HMDFE can supplement intrinsic rewards for cooperative roadway 
behavior.99     
2. Inadequacies of the Tort System 
 The criminal law system does not drive solo.  The tort system deters and punishes 
motorists involved in collisions as well.100  In a world with no automobile insurance and 
no judgment-proof drivers, we might anticipate that the tort system would deter collisions 
rather well.  Of course, there would still be costs of relying on the tort system: litigation 
is expensive and slow; the costs associated with the tort system will diminish its ability to 
deter frequent but low-magnitude collisions; and trial outcomes are often unpredictable 
because of problems of proof and other factors,101 engendering uncertainty that affects 
settlements that occur in the shadow of trial outcomes.102   
For related reasons, legal scholars like Bob Ellickson have hypothesized that 
within close-knit groups reputation-based systems for enforcing social norms may 
outperform the tort system at preventing misconduct and resolving disputes about 
entitlements.103  Ellickson studied the interactions of cattle ranchers in rural California, a 
                                                 
98 Timo Lajunen et al., Dimensions of Driver Anger, Aggressive and Highway Close Violations and 
their Mediation by Safety Orientation in UK Drivers, TRANSP. RESEARCH PART F 107, 118 (1998) 
(comparing British and American attitudes). 
99 Monetary rewards for cooperative driving should never be so high as to encourage people to engage 
in courteous driving as a fulltime job.  Cf. Saul Levmore, Carrots and Torts 203, 208, in CHICAGO 
LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (Eric Posner ed. 2000) (making this point about the inadvisability of 
rewards for those who wear seatbelts, as opposed to penalties for those who do not).  There are too many 
cars on most urban and suburban expressways as is. 
100 Gary T. Schwartz, Auto No-Fault and First-Party Insurance: Advantages and Problems, 73 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 611, 614 (2000). 
101 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 602-04 (5th ed. 1998) 
102 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to 
Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 50-56 (1996) 
103 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 167 (1991); see 
generally Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 
338, 409 (1997) (discussing subsequent scholarship that sheds light on the validity of Ellickson’s 
hypothesis). 
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classic close-knit group, and found that in their dealings with each other they ignored the 
law of trespass, replacing it with neighborliness norms that were more efficient.  One can 
conceptualize HMDFE as a technological fix that transforms a loose-knit group into a 
close-knit group, thereby enhancing the probability that welfare-maximizing social norms 
will emerge.104  We might expect that just as norms evidently outperform trespass law in 
regulating cattle encroachments in rural California,105 norms might outperform tort suits 
in regulating motorist behavior. 
 There is a critical difference between HMDFE and the type of norm enforcement 
regime that Ellickson described: the heightened importance of the automobile insurance 
market.  Very quickly, an assessment of the tort system for regulating collisions requires 
an assessment of that market.  In the automobile insurance market there are three 
fundamental and well-understood problems: moral hazard, adverse selection, and 
judgment-proof motorists.106  HMDFE has the potential to ameliorate each of them. 
 The moral hazard problem is addressed because one would not expect to see the 
development of an insurance market to insure against fines that arose as a result of 
HMDFE reports.  Just as one cannot insure against parking tickets or moving violations, 
we would not expect to see insurers viewing the HMDFE fines system as a regime that 
warranted their time.  The fines would be too small for most motorists and the adverse 
selection problem too great to warrant entry by insurers.  So whereas automobile 
insurance will reduce drivers’ safety incentives somewhat, HMDFE should not be 
susceptible to the same problem. 
 The adverse selection problem is an information asymmetries issue.  Motorists 
know more about their driving skills and propensities than insurance companies do, so 
                                                 
104 “Loose-knit groups are clusters of individuals among whom information pertinent to social control 
does not circulate easily.  These loose-knit groups are typically composed of members who do not expect to 
be repeat players or who are unable to gather accurate information about another member’s reputation even 
if repeat-player interactions do occur.”  Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to 
Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 360-61 (2003). 
105 Ellickson, supra note 103, at 185-89. 
106 See Alma Cohen & Rajeev Dehejia, The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Accident Liability 
Laws on Traffic Fatalities, 47 J.L. & ECON. 357 (2004) (finding statistical evidence for the existence of 
moral hazard in the automobile insurance market); Steven W. Pottier & Robert C. Witt, On the Demand for 
Liability Insurance: An Insurance Economics Perspective, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1681, 1686 (1994) (discussing 
the adverse selection problem); S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45 
(1986) (discussing the problems created by judgment proof defendants in insurance markets).  
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unsafe drivers may try to take advantage of this asymmetry by obtaining generous 
insurance policies.  Insurers will have a hard time distinguishing between unsafe drivers 
and risk averse drivers among the ranks of those seeking generous policies, and will 
expend substantial resources trying to exclude the former while insuring the latter.  By 
providing insurers with far more information about individual drivers’ behavior than they 
currently have, HMDFE can reduce this information asymmetry, thereby causing the 
insurance market to function much more efficiently.107  The section that follows will 
examine the problems created by these information asymmetries in more detail. 
 Finally, HMDFE can address the judgment-proof defendant problem. Vehicular 
accidents are expensive occurrences, easily destroying thousands of dollars in property 
even if no injuries occur.  Uninsured motorists may well be judgment proof with respect 
to these amounts.  Where injuries do occur, the costs can escalate into the hundreds of 
thousands of dollars, an amount that vastly exceeds the payout limits on most drivers’ 
insurance policies.  Many Americans will be judgment proof when such figures are 
involved.  Accidents, in short, are low-probability, high-cost events.  HMDFE fines, by 
contrast, are high-probability, low-cost events.  Many motorists who would be judgment 
proof with respect to tort damages, or who have insufficient income to obtain automobile 
insurance, will have sufficient assets to pay HMDFE fines, and the state will be in a 
strong position to collect these fines.  Thus, HMDFE stands ready to deter those 
individuals, especially the uninsured, whose unsafe driving is insufficiently deterred by 
the present regime.  
3. Reducing Information Asymmetries 
As I suggested in the previous section, obtaining more complete information 
about driver conduct could permit insurers to make more fine-grained decisions about 
individual drivers’ risk profiles and eliminate pernicious actuarial practices.  Insurance 
                                                 
107 Indeed, this information could have second-order benefits as well.  The lack of information about 
driving propensities becomes a problem in tort trials, heightening the risk of an erroneous judgment.  If 
HMDFE scores did correlate strongly with accident risks, then making HMDFE reputation scores 
admissible at trial could enhance the efficiency of the tort system.  Presently, however, evidence of past 
accidents or traffic citations is inadmissible in most jurisdictions, except in cases where no eye-witnesses to 
an accident survived.  See 61 C.J.S. MOTOR VEHICLES § 1079.  Perhaps the inadmissibility of this 
information is itself connected to the sporadic nature of such data for most drivers.  In that case, the less 
sporadic nature of HMDFE might address these concerns.   
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companies, of course, do get information about drivers from citation reports, reported 
collisions, and other losses.  But the data available as a result of these sources still leaves 
large gaps in the system.  These gaps are filled, in large measure, by resort to group-
based premium setting,108 imposing a collective sanction on all motorists who fit a 
particular profile.  Information asymmetries thus raise substantial distributive justice 
concerns in the automobile insurance market. 
Part of the problem is that, for most motorists, crashes are freakish events that 
occur very infrequently.109  As a result, A’s past experience with crashes will not predict 
his future likelihood of a crash particularly well.110  The problem is exacerbated by the 
substantial underreporting of vehicular collisions and systematic inaccuracies in collision 
reports,111 as well as the prevalence of hit and run crashes, which account for 
approximately twelve percent of all collisions.112   If insurers had more data about near 
misses, then future accidents could be predicted with improved accuracy113 but near 
misses are rarely reported.  In short, crashes occur rarely enough to render collision 
history an insufficient data source for safety evaluations.  If only crash data could be 
supplemented with observational data, insurers could assess risks with much greater 
accuracy.114   
                                                 
108 For example, California insurers relied heavily on insured drivers’ zip codes to set automobile 
insurance premiums after finding that drivers residing in certain neighborhoods were more likely to be 
involved in accidents.  See Michael Liedtke, Study Hits Insurance Rate Disparities, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, 
Dec. 20, 2005, at F4.  While insurers are prohibited by law from charging differentially on the basis of race, 
a good driver who moved from a predominantly white neighborhood to a predominantly African American 
neighborhood could expect to pay between $537 and $974 more for annual automobile insurance 
premiums.  Id. 
109 Grey at al., supra note 18, at 19. 
110 Tijerna, supra note 18, at 6 (noting that involvement in property damage crashes are a poor 
predictor of fatal crashes); see also Baojin Wang, Safety in the Road Environment: A Driver Behavioural 
Response Perspective, 29 TRANSPORTATION 253, 255 (2002) (discussing other problems associated with 
using past accidents to predict future accidents). 
111 A.E. af Wahlberg, Some Methodological Deficiencies in Studies on Traffic Accident Predictors, 35 
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 472, 474 (2003); M.J. Williams, Validity of the Traffic Conflicts 
Technique, 13 ACCID. ANAL. & PREV. 133, 142 (1981).  Even countries that mandate the reporting of all 
accidents experience substantial underreporting.  Jonathan Alsop & John Langley, Under-Reporting of 
Motor Vehicle Traffic Crash Victims in New Zealand, 33 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 353, 354 
(2001). 
112 In 2003 in Wisconsin, there were 17,176 hit and run crashes and 140,265 total crashes.  See 
WISCONSIN DEPT OF TRANSP., 2004 WISCONSIN TRAFFIC CRASH FACTS, Ch. 2, at 21 (July 2005). 
113 Tijerna, supra note 18, at 9. 
114 Id. at 5. 
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Information asymmetries present particularly daunting challenges for two high-
risk groups: the youngest drivers and the oldest drivers.115  Begin with the former group.  
Teenagers who have just received their driver’s licenses are particularly accident prone116 
and are unusually likely to tailgate other drivers.117  Yet information about teens’ driving 
abilities is in short supply because they have driven so few miles, and even poor drivers 
have received few citations and been involved in few crashes.118   
The situation with the elderly is in many ways similar.  Seniors have lengthy 
driving records, but may see their driving abilities deteriorate rapidly because of slowed 
reflexes, worsening eyesight, dementia, and other health problems.119  Seniors cause 
approximately ¼ of all fatal collisions, and they suffer disproportionately from collisions 
because of their lessened resiliency to trauma.120  Indeed, per mile driven, older drivers 
are just as likely to be involved in accidents as novice drivers.121  At the same time, 
seniors who retain their car keys do not drive very much,122 so information about their 
driving abilities may be in short supply.  Seniors typically compensate for their 
diminished driving abilities by driving more slowly.  As a result, their fading driving 
skills may not be reflected in increased traffic citations.123  State governments,124 health 
care providers, and relatives often fail to recognize cognitive impairments in time or feel 
reluctant to take the keys away from a loved one.125  Reference to HMD data on 
                                                 
115 On the heightened risks faced by very young and very old drivers, see David Schlundt et al., 
Reducing Unintentional Injuries on the Nation’s Highways: A Literature Review, 15 J. OF HEALTH CARE 
FOR THE POOR AND UNDERSERVED 76, 84-85 (2004). 
116 McCartt et al., supra note 93, at 320. 
117 M. McDonald et al., Close Following on the Motorway: Initial Findings of an Instrumented Vehicle 
Study 4, Paper Presented at the 7th Vision in Vehicles Conference, Marseille, France, Sept. 1997 
118 Id. at 313, 320. 
119 Schlundt et al., supra note 115, at 85;  Jane C. Stutts & Jean W. Wilkins, On-road Driving 
Evaluations: A Potential Tool for Helping Older Adults Drive Safely Longer, 34 J. SAFETY RES. 431 
(2003). 
120 Margaret F. Brinig et al., Standards for Licensing and Driving 4 (Univ. of Iowa Law Sch. Working 
Paper 2005); Schlundt et al., supra note 115, at 85; Stutts & Wilkins, supra note 119, at 431. 
121 Marilyn Di Stefano & Wendy Macdonald, Assessment of Older Drivers: Relationships Among On-
Road Errors, Medical Conditions, and Test Outcome, 34 J. SAFETY RESEARCH 415 (2003). 
122 ROBIN OLSON, SENIOR DRIVING ISSUES: UPCOMING CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 9-10 (2004). 
123 Id. at 10; Sivak, supra note 6, at 266; see also Di Stefano & Macdonald, supra note 121, at 416 
(noting that senior drivers rarely drive in excess of the speed limit). 
124 Stutts & Wilkins, supra note 119, at 431. 
125 Margaret A. Perkinson et al., Driving and Dementia of the Alzheimer Type: Beliefs and Cessation 
Strategies Among Stakeholders, 45 GERONTOLOGIST 676, 677 (2005); Victor G. Valcour, Self-Reported 
Driving, Cognitive Status, and Physician Awareness of Cognitive Impairment, 50 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 
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individual teens and seniors would allow insurers to sort the good drivers from the bad 
more accurately.126 
C. Controlling Secondary Effects from Aggressive Driving 
 The foregoing discussion focused on the tangible effects of reducing aggressive 
driving, as they relate to driver safety, lives saved, property damage averted, and traffic 
obstructed.  Quite apart from these considerations, there are a number of external benefits 
that might be associated with the implementation of a HMDFE program to curtail 
aggressive driving.  These benefits help underscore the value of HMDFE because they 
are benefits that the criminal law and tort systems do an exceedingly poor job of 
promoting.  
1. Everyday Unhappiness 
 While the costs associated with driver deaths and injuries are quite substantial, 
they may well be dwarfed by the sheer unhappiness associated with commutes to and 
from work.  There is reason to believe that HMDFE would alleviate much of this 
unhappiness.  By making drivers accountable, HMDFE could make driving more 
pleasurable, and this effect, in and of itself, could result in enormous improvements in 
human happiness.   
                                                                                                                                                 
1265, 1266-67 (2002); see also Stutts & Wilkins, supra note 119, at 431 (noting that seniors often lose self 
esteem and personal freedom when they lose their driving privileges). 
126 The suboptimal policing point and the information asymmetries point, in conjunction, tell us 
something interesting about optimal law enforcement policy.  Classic economic approaches to crime 
assume that society should set the penalty for a crime so as to make the crime’s costs (to the criminal) 
exceed its benefits (to the criminal). See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 242 (5th ed. 
1998); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 176-77 
(1968).  If existing penalties prove inadequate, resulting in too much crime, society can respond by raising 
the likelihood of apprehension or raising the penalty for those caught.  In theory, the state will be 
indifferent as between these two strategies.  In practice, given the costs associated with raising the 
likelihood of detection, classic law-and-economics analysis often points in the direction of ramping up 
penalties instead of increasing the risk of apprehension.  See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 78 (2d ed. 1989); Bruce L. Hay, Fee Awards and Optimal Deterrence, 71 CHI.-
KENT. L. REV. 505, 507 (1995).  But where we have a vibrant insurance market in place whose premium-
setting strategies piggyback on information generated by criminal enforcement actions, society should 
prefer law enforcement strategies that raise the likelihood of detection.  Rare but severe state punishments 
will leave insurers in the dark about most of their customers’ driving attributes and may wipe out those 
whose misdeeds are detected by law enforcement, rendering unlucky wrongdoers indifferent to the 
marginal effects of increased insurance premiums.  Frequent but measured sanctions for misconduct, by 
contrast, will allow insurers to sort among safe and unsafe citizens more effectively.  In those areas, like 
traffic enforcement, where a robust insurance market exists and where the state relies on sporadic 
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 In recent years economists have begun exploring the value of happiness.  
Experimental work by Daniel Kahneman and coauthors has prompted research subjects 
to assess their state of well being when performing various daily life tasks.127  The 
researchers used a large sample of working women and a day reconstruction method, 
whereby the subjects would record diaries at the end of each day detailing their activities 
and how they felt while doing them.128  The study separated out sixteen major life 
activities and ranked them in order of how happy people felt doing them.  Commuting to 
work ranked dead last, noticeably below the two next least popular activities of 
housework and working.129  The average subject spent 1.6 unhappy hours per day 
commuting.130  We know from other research that the vast majority of this time was spent 
alone, in their cars.131   
 Commuters, then, are a rather miserable lot.  Why so glum?  This is not a question 
that Kahneman and his co-authors asked, but there is data on this question from 
transportation scholars, all of which blames rudeness and aggressive driving.  When 
Porter and Berry surveyed frustrated drivers in a 2001 paper and asked them what was 
the most important cause of their frustration, driver rudeness won in a landslide.  Fully 
43.5% of respondents stated that “discourteous drivers” was the greatest source of 
frustration, versus 20.8% who identified “congestion,” 12.7% who identified “drivers not 
following the law,” 4% who stated “too many stop lights,” and 1% who complained most 
about the length of their commute.132  This data echoed findings by other researchers,133 
                                                                                                                                                 
enforcement and high penalties, the case for creating a supplemental source of information about citizen 
misconduct, such as HMDFE, becomes powerful.      
127 Kahneman et al., supra note 9, at 1776. 
128 For a discussion of some of the methodological challenges in well-being research, see Carol 
Graham, The Economics of Happiness, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (forthcoming 
2d ed.). 
129 Kahneman et al., supra note 9, at 1777 tbl. 1.  “Intimate relations” easily ranked first on the 
happiness score, followed by socializing, relaxing, praying, and eating.  Id.  
130 Id. 
131 Lorna Aldrich, Commuting and the Economic Functions of Small Towns and Places, 12 Rural Dev. 
Persp. 26, 26 (1998); Craig N. Oren, Getting Commuters out of Their Cars: What Went Wrong?, 17 Stan. 
Envtl. L.J. 141, 163-64 (1998); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social 
Norms: Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1232, 1235 (2000). 
132 Porter & Berry, supra note 97, at 738 tbl. 2.  18.1% identified “other” primary concerns.  The data 
suggests this unhappiness results from a “few bad apples” problem, as polls suggest that drivers view most 
of their fellow motorists as “courteous and gracious.”  Robert F. Blomquist, American ‘Road Rage’: A 
Scary and Tangled Cultural-Legal Pastiche, 80 NEB. L. REV. 17, 25 (2001). 
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and there is a psychological literature connecting road rage and vehicular collisions to 
clinical depression and post-traumatic stress disorder.134  If we put together the 
Kahneman research with the transportation survey research, we very quickly arrive at the 
conclusion that aggressive driving is the source of substantial disutility that Americans 
encounter in they day-to-day lives.  This disutility leads to collisions,135 to be sure, but a 
useful result of the happiness research is to show that even if aggressive driving did not 
lead to any additional collisions, it would still be a substantial social ill worth addressing 
through public policy interventions. 
2. Expressive Benefits 
 Standard approaches to criminal law assume that enforcing the law is an 
undesirable activity that the state’s agents (police officers) must be paid to do.  The 
limited data available from HMD programs, along with the data from governmental pilot 
programs designed to elicit information about aggressive driving, suggests that there is a 
substantial portion of the civilian population that is willing to tattle on unsafe and 
discourteous drivers, even if doing so entails some financial costs and no financial 
benefits.   
The present approach to traffic regulation ignores the “consumer surplus” that 
would be associated with enabling lay people to express their opinions about fellow 
drivers to punish bad drivers and reward good drivers. But these expressive benefits 
ought to be an important part of the calculus, and not only because expressing these 
opinions might alleviate the frustration that sometimes engenders aggressive driving or 
road rage.  Rather, they seem to produce genuine welfare gains for the drivers who feel 
                                                                                                                                                 
133 See, e.g., Deffenbacker et al., supra note 18, at 85 (finding that illegal driving behavior annoys 
research subjects much less than various hostile gestures and discourtesy on the roadway); Lajunen et al., 
supra note 98, at 110 (finding that among 33 driving situations, nine out of the ten most frustrating 
situations to U.K. motorists were in the “discourtesy” or “hostile gestures” categories, including “someone 
cuts in and takes the parking spot you have been waiting for,” “someone is driving very close to your rear 
bumper,” “someone cuts in right in front of you on the motorway,” “someone backs out right in front of 
you without looking,” “at night someone is driving right behind you with bright lights on,” “someone 
makes an obscene gesture toward you about your driving,” and “someone speeds up when you try to pass 
them”); Shinar & Compton, supra note 17, at 429 (noting survey results in which road rage / aggressive 
driving was rated as the single greatest safety concern by 39% of poll respondents, versus 11% who said 
drunk driving). 
134 See Smart & Mann, supra note 6, at 187 (citing sources). 
135 See, e.g., Deffenbacker et al., supra note 18, at 84. 
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impotent and stifled under the status quo but whose complaints would be taken seriously 
under a HMDFE regime.136  The effects of law enforcement on the enforcers, in short, 
can be just as important as the effects on enforcees.   
III. Objections to “How’s My Driving?” for Everyone 
 Having made out what I believe to be a rather strong affirmative case for 
HMDFE, I shall now proceed to discuss some of the serious objections that no doubt 
have occurred to readers.  Several of these objections have merit, although I shall suggest 
that, even in combination, they do not offset the advantages detailed above.  Moreover, a 
few of the arguments that at first glance look like objections ultimately may strengthen 
the case for implementing HMDFE. 
A. Inaccurate and Malicious Feedback 
 A HMDFE system is only as good as the feedback it receives, so it is worth 
examining the anticipated accuracy of said feedback.  We can identify two quite different 
problems here: First, deliberately inaccurate (positive or negative) feedback, and second, 
feedback provided in good faith that turns out to be mistaken.  The former issue presents 
greater challenges, and should be treated at length. 
 It is rather easy to imagine scenarios whereby HMDFE systems could be abused.  
Let us bring the most troublesome scenarios to the forefront.  Suppose a racist driver 
cruises around town, assigning negative feedback to African American or Asian 
American motorists who are driving in an acceptable manner.  Alternatively, imagine that 
HMDFE feedback is used as part of a harassment campaign against an unpopular 
individual for reasons having nothing to do with her driving performance.  There is no 
doubt that if HMDFE is implemented, this type of distasteful conduct will occur, as will 
occasional inaccurately positive feedback.  That said, there is reason to believe that such 
misconduct will be rare, that technology can ameliorate such problems when they do 
arise, and that the problems associated with biased drivers would be no worse than the 
problems created by biased cops in the current police-based traffic enforcement regime. 
                                                 
136 Frustrated drivers often express their frustration and anger by honking their horns.  This is an 
unsatisfying response, in that it imposes few costs on the source of the driver’s frustration, and it also 
engenders substantial noise pollution externalities. 
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 Commercial fleet drivers sometimes object to HMD programs based on a fear that 
callers will phone in false reports.137  Yet it turns out that inaccurate reporting for 
commercial fleet drivers are uncommon in HMD programs, and anonymous reports 
generally are not permitted, although the identity of callers is not reported to the 
offending drivers.138  Rather, the pattern of calls to HMD call centers suggests that the 
concern about false reports are overblown.  A small minority of drivers prompt the 
majority of calls, and after these drivers are identified for retraining or discharge, fleet 
accident rates drop sharply.139  This evidence cannot be reconciled easily with the 
hypothesis that many HMD calls are motivated by racial animus, harassment, or pranks.  
To be sure, drivers of passenger vehicles might be more susceptible to malicious reports 
thanks to the greater proximity of the driver to his or her rear bumper, and women and 
minorities may be underrepresented in the ranks of commercial drivers.  Still, while one 
might expect to see more prejudiced feedback in HMDFE than HMD for commercial 
vehicles, there is little reason to expect a plethora of false reports in the HMDFE context. 
 The phenomenon of false feedback is a concern that arises in online reputation 
regimes, and software developers, as well as economists, have developed algorithms that 
can detect deliberately false feedback.  Essentially, the idea is that the system discounts 
outlier scores – instances in which a buyer gives negative feedback on an 
overwhelmingly well-rated merchant or vise versa.140  There is a cost to eliminating these 
outliers, in that a good merchant sometimes behaves badly, just as a good driver 
sometimes makes mistakes.141  That said, in an environment like eBay, where most users 
are behaving honestly, algorithms designed to weed out likely false reports are welfare 
enhancing.142  Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that online reputation tracking 
                                                 
137 Banstetter, supra note 26, at 1A. 
138 See DRIVER’S ALERT, supra note 30, at Frequently Asked Questions 1; see also Safety Alert, 
Frequently Asked Questions, <http://www.safetyalert.com/faq.asp#serviceswork> (claiming that 99% of all 
calls logged by a HMD monitoring company represent valid complaints).  
139 Emerson, supra note 27, at T3; KNIPLING ET AL., supra note 25, at § 3.12. 
140 Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Immunizing Online Reputation Reporting Systems Against Unfair Ratings 
and Discriminatory Behavior 153, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2ND ACM CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC 
COMMERCE (2000). 
141 Id. at 155; Bin Yu & Munindar P. Singh, A Social Mechanism in Reputation Management in 
Electronic Communities, CIA 2000, LNAI 1860, at 154, 164 (2000). 
142 Sonja Buchegger & Jean Yves Le Boudec, The Effect of Rumor Spreading in Reputation Systems 
for Multiple Ad-hoc Networks 9, Working Paper presented at WiOpt ’03: Modeling and Optimization in 
Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks, Sophia-Antipolis, France (March 2003). 
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technologies are still in their infancy, and dramatic improvements to the eBay system for 
identifying false feedback can be expected in the years ahead.143 
 These algorithms could be adapted to the HMDFE regime quite readily.  Indeed, 
by gaining more information about drivers than eBay has about buyers and sellers, the 
system could police racist and other forms of problematic feedback quite effectively.  For 
example, if a HMDFE system knows the race of various drivers, it can discount or ignore 
entirely the ratings of white drivers who routinely assign suspiciously high levels of 
negative feedback to African American drivers.  Similarly, if the system knows where 
people work, study, and live, it can discount or ignore feedback among people who live 
in the same household, attend the same high school, or who work for the same 
company.144  Moreover, the system can discount repeat evaluations among the same 
drivers.  In an urban environment, if one driver or a group of drivers are repeatedly giving 
positive or negative feedback to another driver, there is probably something fishy going 
on, and the system can ignore these suspicious rankings.145  In other words, so long as we 
are willing to seed a HMDFE system with information about characteristics that might 
form the basis for inaccurate feedback, the use of algorithms can more effectively 
ameliorate the problems associated with deliberate inaccuracy.   
In some respects, HMDFE would be better equipped to deal with malicious 
feedback than the online reputation sites.  Online reputation sites suffer somewhat 
because users with poor reputations can always “flush” their existing identities and start 
over with a blank slate.146  A HMDFE would use each participant’s unique identifier 
(vehicle VIN numbers and / or driver’s license numbers) to prevent these sorts of 
evasions.  A well-designed HMDFE system, in short, ought to be able to ameliorate the 
problems with malicious feedback.  Like Wikipedia, eBay, and open source projects, it 
                                                 
143 Miller, supra note 57, at 27. 
144 Collusive ratings are a problem for online feedback systems generally, though eBay has been able 
to keep this problem at tolerable levels to date.  Chrysanthos Dellarocas, The Digitization of Word-of-
Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Reputation Mechanisms 26 (MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 
4296-03 2003). 
145 Scholars who study reputation networks have identified this problem and shown how it can be 
solved if participants use unique identifier numbers (e.g., VIN numbers or driver’s license numbers).  Jay 
Schneider et al., Disseminating Trust Information in Wearable Communities, 4 PERSONAL TECHNOLOGIES 
245, 247 (2000).    
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will not be able to eliminate malicious information entirely.  But algorithms, combined 
with driver information from motorist reports, pre-existing government records, and 
third-party databases, provide a promising substitute for Wikipedia’s voting system, 
eBay’s fraud patrols, and open source filtering mechanisms.147  
 One additional point is worth emphasizing on this score.  It is not appropriate to 
compare a HMDFE regime with occasional inaccurate reporting to an ideal system of 
police enforcement of traffic laws.  Police enforcement in the real world is distinctly not 
first-best.  Police officers are prone to the same biases as other people,148 and training to 
correct for those biases is imperfect.  Delegating traffic enforcement to drivers 
themselves is a nice way of ensuring that traffic enforcers reflect the demographics of the 
surrounding communities.   
 What about feedback that the caller believes to be true, but that turns out not to be 
accurate?  On the whole, the experience of companies using HMD programs and the 
experimental research on driving attitudes suggests that the signal-to-noise ratio from 
HMDFE would be comfortingly high.  There is, admittedly, some evidence to suggest 
that individuals may rely on stereotypes to generate their opinions of what contributed to 
a particular collision.  After presenting research subjects with written descriptions of 
accidents and asking them to assign blame, Lawrence and Richardson found that gender 
                                                                                                                                                 
146 Cynthia G. McDonald & V. Carlos Slawson, Jr., Reputation in an Internet Auction Market, 40 
ECON. INQUIRY 633, 640 (2002). 
147 The solid performance of various “peer assessment” metrics, such as “360 degree” feedback, in 
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148 See, e.g., Matthew Petrocelli et al., Conflict Theory and Racial Profiling: An Empirical Analysis of 
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in traffic stop-based searches.  See Ruben Hernandez-Murillo & John Knowles, Racial Profiling or Racist 
Policing? Bounds Tests in Aggregate Data, 45 INT’L ECON. REV. 959, 981-84 (2004). 
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and car type significantly affected these judgments.149  More specifically, male drivers 
were judged to be more aggressive (a stereotype that is consistent with other data),150 and 
female drivers were judged to be more careless (a stereotype that is not supported by 
other data).151  Similarly, BMW drivers were judged more likely to have behaved 
aggressively than drivers of tiny Smartcars (a stereotype that is consistent with some, but 
not all, of the other data).152  In laboratory settings, then, people are influenced by 
external factors in designating other drivers as blameworthy.   
In real-world settings, where aggressive driving often provokes visceral 
responses, these biases tend to fade into the background.  For example, the intensity of 
driver reactions and the length of their verbal response did not differ when they were 
confronted by honking low-status or high-status vehicles on the roadway, although 
research subjects did accelerate more quickly to get away from honking drivers of low-
status vehicles.153  This suggests that the data produced by a HMDFE data will not 
perfectly reflect what actually happens on the roadways, but it should reflect it well 
enough to cause the system to operate reasonably well.  Indeed, other feedback systems, 
such as eBay’s, should be susceptible to some of the same biases, based on seller names 
and existing reputation, and yet those feedback systems are generally hailed as major 
successes.  Moreover, keeping in mind the relevant comparison is again useful here.  
Police officers will hold many of the same subconscious biases,154 and these biases may 
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154 See supra note 148. 
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be more problematic in the officer context because resource constraints require high 
levels of selective enforcement on the roadways.    
B. Distracted Driving 
 By enabling drivers to complain about others’ misconduct, a HMDFE regime 
might distract them from their first priority, which is to operate a motor vehicle safely.155  
In the last few years, as cell phones have proliferated, policymakers and researchers have 
devoted increased attention to the risks associated with driver distraction.  Some of these 
concerns have prompted state legislatures to require drivers to use hands-free cell phone 
devices, although no U.S. jurisdiction has banned calling while driving altogether.156  The 
best available evidence suggests that conversing on a cell phone increases collision risk 
marginally, perhaps not by enough to warrant regulation in light of the productivity gains 
associated with the in-vehicle use of communications devices.157 
 An impressive study by Wilson, Fang, Wiggins & Cooper combined observation 
of cell phone use on public roadways with research into the driving records and collision 
histories of those seen using cell phones versus those seen not using cell phones.  Their 
study found that drivers “observed using a cell phone had a risk of an at-fault crash 1.16 
times greater than did drivers not using cell phones.”158  For males, the relationship 
between observed cell phone use and collisions was not statistically significant, though it 
was significant for females.159  By contrast, having previously incurred a citation for 
aggressive driving multiplied the likelihood of collision involvement by 1.84 for all 
drivers and by 1.76 for males.160  Being aged 16-24 enhanced the likelihood of collision 
involvement by factors of 1.74 for all drivers and 1.99 for males, and being 25-34 
multiplied the likelihood of collision involvement by 1.53 for all drivers and 1.6 for 
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males.161  For all drivers, the increased risk associated with being a cell phone user was 
essentially equal to the increased risk associated with being aged 35-44 (as opposed to 45 
or older).162  Wilson and co-authors did note that cell phone use was associated with 
other-high risk behaviors that enhanced collision risk, but a multivariate regression 
analysis revealed that cell phone use’s role in enhancing collision risk was “relatively 
minor.”163  Equally important, the very high collision risk associated with aggressive 
driving violations (despite the rarity with which these violations were detected) makes it 
plausible that the increased collision risk associated with encouraging HMD cell phone 
reports would be dwarfed by the decreased collision risk associated with detecting and 
deterring aggressive driving.164       
 Another comprehensive study of Virginia traffic accidents analyzed the various 
causes of crash-related driver distraction.165  The researchers found that cell phone use 
did contribute to some traffic accidents, but that it ranked well below looking at scenery, 
rubbernecking, and eating and drinking as a contributor to collisions.166  Cell phone use 
ranked slightly above adjusting vehicle controls as a contributor to traffic accidents.167  
On the whole, the research findings suggested that cell phone use did cause some 
accidents, but far fewer accidents than other manifestations of driver distraction that 
currently go unregulated.  Moreover, if it is true that HMDFE would decrease collisions 
by deterring aggressive driving and helping to remove the worst drivers from the roads, 
then this would generate substantial benefits from a driver distraction perspective, since 
rubbernecking is such an important contributor to crashes.  Fewer accidents leads to less 
distraction, which results in fewer accidents.  And so on.  Other research suggested that 
two aspects of cell phone use are dangerous while driving: manipulating a phone (e.g., 
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dialing numbers while driving), and engaging in intense conversations that demand a 
great deal of attention, focus, and computational brainpower.168   
 There are studies that reach very different conclusions, lending a note of caution 
to these conclusions about cell phone usage and collisions, although some of these studies 
do not control for the observed correlation between cell phone use and other risky driving 
behaviors.169  If these studies are to be believed, then cell phone usage may result in 
moderate, or even major, increases in collision risk.  In that case, even short duration 
calls to HMD centers could result in measurable increases in collision nationwide. 
 In light of this research suggesting that cell phone use probably increases collision 
risk mildly to moderately, three points are worth making.  The first point is that voice 
recognition and other technologies stand poised to decrease the impairments associated 
with cell phone use while driving.170  The second point is that even if cell phone use as 
such does increase accident risk, the incremental increase in cell phone use resulting from 
the implementation of a HMDFE program would be rather small.  After all, motorists will 
spend far more time talking to friends, relatives, clients, and services providers than they 
will spend talking to HMD operators, even in a 1-800-based HMDFE system.  Moreover, 
reports called into an HMD system can be used to identify those callers whose use of in-
vehicle communications adversely affects their driving performance.    
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 The third point is the key.  As the studies referenced above make plain, cell phone 
use is hardly the most significant source of driver distraction.  Indeed, other research 
suggests that the frustration associated with seeing other drivers behave rudely or 
aggressively is very substantial, and that this frustration is itself a source of distraction.171  
So while a HMDFE system would increase the distraction associated with reporting 
others’ misconduct, it promises to alleviate the distraction that arises from fuming about 
another’s driving and either feeling powerless to do anything about it, or contemplating 
some means of retaliating against the offending driver.172  And, of course, when 
retaliation does occur, via light flashing, honking, gesturing, and the like, the result may 
be the distraction of two drivers – both the initial offender and the frustrated retaliator.   
 In short, in order to determine the net driver distraction effects of HMDFE, we 
would need to balance the incremental danger of distraction by callers against the 
incremental danger of driver frustration resulting from an inability to report bad driving.  
Seen in that light, it may be that the net effect of a HMDFE system would be a decrease 
in driver distraction, notwithstanding the enhanced use of telecommunications devices 
required in order to log complaints. 
C. Privacy Interests 
 Privacy advocates occasionally sound the alarm about automated enforcement 
regimes in the driving context, whereby rental car companies or insurance companies 
monitor individual drivers’ behavior through the use of GPS or other surveillance 
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technologies.173  When discussions involve sharing such information with the 
government, these same privacy advocates are quick to invoke George Orwell’s 1984.174  
 I teach and write about privacy law,175 but I have difficulty understanding the 
appeal of these kinds of claims.  I can comprehend the individual privacy interest in 
travel destinations and why 24-hour GPS monitoring of a vehicle might intrude on a 
legitimate privacy interest.  After all, 24-hour monitoring of that sort would allow the 
monitor to infer a great deal about the driver’s intimate associations, medical information, 
and political activities.  But we can remedy these concerns by forbidding monitoring 
entities from piecing together information about drivers’ travel patterns and by protecting 
vigilantly the HMDFE databases that would contain information that reveals these 
patterns.  If we focus our attention on technologies that allow governments or insurers to 
discover a motorist’s speed or braking distance, the privacy interests would seem to 
disappear.  There is nothing private about road speed: It can be discerned with substantial 
accuracy by a police officer, a bystander holding a radar gun, or a motorist driving behind 
the car being monitored.  There is no connection between road speed, or propensity to 
tailgate, and intimate conduct of any kind.176  Nor do these bits of information implicate 
our interests in facilitating the development of personalities, affect sensitive medical 
information, or undermine valuable confidential relationships.  Privacy is a means, not an 
end.177  We should protect privacy if, and only if, doing so promotes social welfare.  It is 
difficult to identify such a benefit to roadway anonymity with respect to behaviors like 
road speed, weaving through traffic, and cutting off other motorists.   
 Driving usually takes place in very public places.  Almost everything that could 
be learned through the implementation of a HMDFE regime could be learned through 
multiplying the present number of traffic police by a factor of ten.  Yet virtually no one 
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contends that increasing the number of police officers patrolling the streets would violate 
individual privacy rights.178  HMDFE makes drivers accountable for conduct that is 
public and obscure solely because of resource constraints.  The only time an individual 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to her driving is when hers is the 
only car on the roadways.  In those settings, HMDFE would protect the privacy of her 
conduct, because there would be no one around to report any good or bad driving.  The 
privacy objection to HMDFE, in short, is a non-starter.  
D. Why Not Fully Automated Enforcement? 
 In recent years, traffic planners have become increasingly enamored with 
automated means for improving traffic flow and safety.  Various technologies are being 
developed by research and development departments at car manufacturers and in 
engineering faculties.  For example, cars are being developed that will use radar to detect 
instances in which a driver is tailgating another vehicle too closely;179 intersections are 
being fitted with cameras to catch motorists who drive through red lights;180 and 
insurance companies as well as rental car companies and commercial fleets are testing the 
use of GPS to monitor speeding by individual drivers.181  Many of these approaches hold 
promise, and research into these programs can proceed alongside the roll-out of 
HMDFE.182  Indeed, because automated systems might provide an objective means of 
corroborating some of the information reported to HMD centers, these systems could 
enable researchers to spot-check the accuracy of the information aggregated via HMDFE.  
                                                                                                                                                 
177 See Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 394 (1978). 
178 One paper that comes close to taking this position is Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and 
the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 
82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1374-77, 1443-47 (2004).  Blitz suggests that while sporadic police surveillance of 
public streets would not violate the Fourth Amendment, complete surveillance of these same streets would.  
Blitz’s argument is admirably ambitious but in the end I do not believe it persuades.  The Fourth 
Amendment has not been read to impose a resource constraint on society’s expenditures on law 
enforcement, nor should the Constitution dictate a maximum level of law enforcement resources that can be 
devoted to policing conduct in public spaces.  The possibility of retreating onto private or communal 
property provides adequate protection for intimate conduct and association, as well as the possibility of 
chance encounters among strangers.   
179 Smart et al., supra note 18, at 48. 
180 Savage et al., supra note 67, at 22. 
181 See Jean, supra note 173, at G3. 
182 See Savage et al., supra note 67, at 22 (finding that the use of automated red light cameras at 
intersections resulted in reductions in injury crashes of between 7% and 29% at those intersections). 
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 It is certainly possible that the implementation of HMDFE would curtail the 
development of technologies designed to promote safer driving.  That said, the case for 
HMDFE over automated enforcement is the case for human judgment and context 
sensitivity.  Driving in excess of the speed limit is efficient in some contexts, whereas in 
other contexts (such as on an icy road), driving at the speed limit exposes other drivers to 
substantial risks.183  Indeed, on a clear and sunny day, when most drivers are doing 70 
miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone, driving at the speed limit is more dangerous 
than driving 70 miles per hour.184  Running a red light at three o’clock in the morning at a 
deserted intersection is sensible; ticketing a driver for engaging in such context serves 
little purpose other than to prompt exasperation with the traffic laws.  Some forms of bad 
driving, such as excessive lane changing or a refusal to let another motorist merge, are 
difficult to detect via automated enforcement.  Other harmful driving habits, like 
excessive braking or darting into a parking spot that another motorist is plainly waiting 
for, are not generally unlawful.  Finally, as has been discussed above, automated 
enforcement offers none of the expressive benefits associated with HMDFE, whereby the 
regime encourages measured and anonymous retaliation for driver misconduct, thereby 
diverting frustrated motorists from more excessive and provocative retaliation.   
 One comparative advantage of HMDFE, as opposed to automated traffic 
enforcement is quite similar to the comparative advantage of HMDFE over traffic 
police’s enforcement of rules.  It is based on a preference for standards and norms over 
rules and laws.  There is a standard-like exception to virtually every “rule” of the road.  
Americans drive on the right, except when the right lane is obstructed, in which case they 
try to move into the left lane when it is safe to do so.  Americans must not run red lights, 
except when it is necessary to do so in order to avoid an accident or get out of the way of 
an emergency vehicle.  Moreover, much of what makes a driving environment pleasant 
and safe manifests as manners that do not lend themselves to rule-based-enforcement via 
technology or police officers who must justify their decisions if challenged.  HMDFE is, 
in short, like a jury system for traffic regulation, where existing laws and rules are 
                                                 
183 Cramton, supra note 89, at 436. 
184 David Navon, The Paradox of Driving Speed: Two Adverse Effects on Highway Accident Rate, 35 
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 361, 366 (2003). 
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modified by social expectations and aspirations to form a body of law that is used to 
reward the cooperators and punish the deviants.185       
E. Shouldn’t We Let the Market Implement HMD on Its Own? 
In order to justify a mandatory regulatory intervention, it is usually appropriate to 
identify a market failure that needs fixing.  At the outset, it is worth recalling that the 
absence of an effective market on the roadway is the source of the aggressive driving 
problem in the first place.  We need not develop a comprehensive reputation tracking 
system in instances where vendors who behave poorly suffer the repercussions.  If a 
Starbucks barista is rude, customers can complain to the shop manager, and since the 
manager has an incentive to keep his customers happy, he will train the employee to 
behave better or fire her if training seems futile.  In the driving context, there is no market 
that binds one driver to another, and this absence of a market both creates the need for 
governmental involvement, via the traffic police and tort system, and opens up the 
possibility for a HMDFE system to displace government regulation with distributed 
enforcement.   
That said, there are major players in the driving market who in some respects 
resemble our Starbucks managers.  Automobile insurance firms, in theory, could 
discipline poor drivers whose policies they underwrite, but at present there is no 
institution that allows a frustrated motorist to identify which insurance company to call in 
order to complain about the pick-up truck driver who nearly rear-ended him.  Insurance 
companies are certainly free to make it worth their customers’ while to participate in a 
HMD scheme, and given the mandate in all 50-states that every motorist carry liability 
insurance, one might expect to see high levels of participation in a purely voluntary HMD 
scheme.  This raises the question of why government mandates are appropriate here. 
                                                 
185 None of this says that a world of HMDFE is a world where all traffic laws get repealed.  Many 
traffic laws, such as the convention that motorists in the U.S. drive on the right and pass on the left, 
establish efficient focal points in coordination and mixed-motive games.  These laws should remain on the 
books to serve as a backstop for driving norms.  Other traffic laws will be useful in determining liability ex 
post where a traffic collision has occurred, particularly if there were not many motorists nearby to witness 
the collision, or if there is strong reason to expect that the witnesses who happened to be nearby were 
biased in a systematic way.   
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The first answer is that a non-universal system would mitigate the expressive benefits 
associated with HMDFE.  More precisely, a HMDFE taps into norms of reciprocity 
whereby motorist A tolerates the possibility that other drivers may punish his own poor 
driving by virtue of his own ability to punish others’ poor driving in exchange.186  Given 
the strong possibility that the least considerate drivers will be most likely to opt out of a 
voluntary HMD program, these expressive benefits will be lost, and these holes in system 
coverage might invite road rage and aggressive retaliation against those who have opted 
out, while simultaneously undermining support for the system as a whole. 
The second answer is that there are millions of drivers who do not have automobile 
insurance,187 and a voluntary HMD regime would not incorporate these drivers into the 
system.  At present, it is rather difficult for police to discover that a particular motorist is 
uninsured.  A HMDFE system could enable law enforcement to detect these vehicles 
more easily, by making it possible to determine quickly whether a vehicle is insured 
based on evidence that can be accessed from the exterior of the car.188  As noted above, 
with HMDFE, a (reduced) number of traffic police would still be required to ensure that 
every motorist is participating faithfully in the system, and this could be accomplished 
through a combination of random checks in traffic and the targeting of vehicles that had 
been the subject of HMD reports but that did not show up as carrying liability insurance 
in a centralized HMD database.  Creating an HMD database would substantially reduce 
the marginal costs of including insurance information in the database. 
The third answer is that there are negative externalities associated with aggressive or 
inappropriate driving that are not borne by individual insurance companies. Automobile 
insurance companies do internalize many of the harms of increased collisions, but not the 
                                                 
186 On reciprocity in punishment, see Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective 
Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003). 
187 Dan Walters, Legislators Spend A Lot of Time Deciding Who Can Legally Drive, SACRAMENTO 
BEE, Oct. 31, 2005, at A3 (noting that in California alone, 15% of motorists lack automobile insurance, 
representing 3.5 million drivers). 
188 The United Kingdom has experimented successfully with real-time accessible databases of insured 
motorists that can be accessed by specially equipped patrol vehicles to identify and impound uninsured 
vehicles based on their license plate numbers.  Steve Womack, Flash! Now Cameras Snare the Uninsured: 
Police Step up the Fight to Force 1.2 Million Motorists off the Road for Driving Without Cover, MAIL ON 
SUNDAY (UK), Aug. 28, 2005, at 18, available in 2005 WLNR 13647594.  Texas is developing a similar 
system.  See Ty Meighan, System a Real Time Check of Insurance: Nearly a Quarter of Texas Drivers 
Don’t Have It, DPS Reports, CORPUS CHRISTI CALLER TIMES, Sep. 22, 2005, at B4.   
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health and psychological costs associated with frustrated and angry drivers, the rising 
vehicle and fossil fuel costs associated with increased expenditures on bigger and safer 
cars, and the law enforcement costs associated with policing traffic violations.  These are 
costs born by the public at large and the state, and they may explain the failure of 
insurance companies to encourage the expansion of HMD beyond commercial fleets.  
Moreover, while individual insurance companies would benefit from having feedback 
about their own customers, they would not benefit (much) from enabling their customers 
to leave feedback about other insurance companies’ customers.  Hence, the provision of 
feedback-enabling technologies in vehicles would be plagued by a minor tragedy of the 
commons, which might well prevent insurers from encouraging the installation of these 
devices in vehicles driven by their customers. 
 Finally, it is worth invoking paternalist rationales in support of mandatory 
HMDFE.  When it comes to driving, commercial and non-commercial drivers alike 
deviate rather substantially from what a rational actor model would predict, with 
cognitive errors and emotional responses adversely affecting driver performance.189  The 
predominant government attitude toward seat belts in the 1970s was that individuals 
could decide for themselves whether they wished to use these safety devices.  Most 
consumers did buckle up, but thousands refused to do so and died as a consequence.  If 
studies of HMD in the commercial fleet context translate into the passenger vehicle 
context, then the argument for HMDFE would look a lot like the argument for click-it or 
ticket laws.  Forcing the universal use of a safety device saves enough lives to warrant the 
associated restrictions on individual liberty.  Indeed, the case for HMDFE is rather 
stronger, in that HMDFE is designed primarily to control the externalities associated with 
driving, whereas mandatory seat belt laws were designed primarily to protect against 
internalized harms.    
                                                 
189 See ANNICH MAINCENT ET AL., TRUCK DRIVER’S BEHAVIOUR AND RATIONAL DRIVING ASSISTANCE 
11-12 (University of Lyon Working Paper 2004) (finding that many commercial truck drivers engage in 
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On balance then, it seems that HMD would be most effective if implemented 
universally, and the government’s ability to mandate participation make it the obvious 
vessel for implementing HMDFE.  There is, of course, a doctrinal glitch associated with 
such an approach: the Due Process Clause.  In the sense that the federal government 
would be deputizing its motorists and enabling any of them to sanction fellow motorists, 
the program would be unprecedented.  The state often encourages private citizens to blow 
the whistle about others’ misconduct, via qui tam statutes, whistleblower protections, and 
signs encouraging motorists to “Be an HOV Hero: Report Carpool Cheats.”  But these 
complaints typically trigger government investigations where the accused are entitled to a 
presumption of innocence.   
 At the same time, there are numerous examples of instances in which the 
government delegates high-stakes decisions about individuals to the community.  Does an 
advertising campaign infringe a registered trademark?  It depends on the extent of 
associated consumer confusion.  Can sexually explicit speech be suppressed?  Will vice 
laws be enforced?  The answer usually depends on whether citizens of the affected 
neighborhoods demand enforcement.  That depends in part on whether it is obscene under 
community standards.  The interesting question raised by HMDFE is “What happens 
when the stakes of a sanction are much lower and the costs of permitting each motorist to 
challenge any sanction in court or administrative proceedings would be prohibitive?”  To 
answer such a question the law would have to fall back on a general balancing approach, 
along the lines of Mathews v. Eldridge.190  Mathews suggests that bare-bones procedures 
may be constitutionally sufficient if they result in reasonably reliable decisions about 
sufficiently low-stakes matters.191  This analysis suggests that a great deal will turn on the 
magnitude of the inaccurate feedback problem identified above.192  To the extent that the 
version of HMDFE proposed so far would be insufficiently accurate under Mathews, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
have a poor sense of the average and marginal costs of driving); Sivak, supra note 6, at 263-68 (giving 
various examples of instances in which driving behavior reflects bounded rationality). 
190 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
191 Id. at 341-49; see also Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1351-52 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(upholding a civil parking fines system under the Due Process Clause, notwithstanding a city policy of not 
requiring police officers to appear at hearings, because “the benefits of requiring the police officer to 
appear at every hearing are unlikely to exceed the costs.”). 
192 See supra text accompanying notes 137-154. 
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part that follows explores some costlier variations that would almost certainly satisfy the 
Mathews test.  
F. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 The ultimate test of HMDFE will be whether it withstands cost-benefit analysis.  
The preceding sections have identified the relative costs and benefits, and it will be 
helpful to recount them briefly here.  Of course, with a new and admittedly radical 
proposal like this one, it will be impossible to generate any reliable estimates of the actual 
dollar figures on either the cost or benefit sides.   
 With respect to benefits, we would be aggregating the value of collisions avoided, 
including lives saved, injuries prevented, work interruptions avoided, litigation and 
insurance administration costs eliminated, and property damage averted.  Data on HMD 
for commercial vehicles suggests that collision reductions could range from 20% to 
50%.193  A recent economic analysis found that the mean social cost of a fatal traffic 
accident in the developed world was approximately $1.5 million in 1999.194  Other recent 
estimates suggest that fatal traffic accidents alone cost the United States 2.2% of its Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP).195  Using the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s 2005 estimate of 
$12.76 trillion for GDP,196 the cost of such accidents in the United States equaled 
$280.73 billion.  A 20% reduction in fatal crashes therefore would save society upwards 
of $56 billion per year, based on these conservative, back-of-the-envelope calculations.  
Other benefits identified in this paper would include cost savings on law enforcement, 
enhanced efficiencies from reduced information asymmetries in the insurance market, 
substantial improvements in everyday driver happiness, and substantial expressive 
benefits from enabling drivers to sanction those who endanger or frustrate fellow 
motorists.  
 On the costs side, we should include the costs associated with establishing a 
HMDFE system, the costs of malicious and inaccurate feedback, and the costs incurred 
                                                 
193 See supra text accompanying notes 27-33. 
194 Anna Trawen et al., International Comparison of Costs of a Fatal Casualty of Road Accidents in 
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195 Kevin M. McDonald, Federal Preemption of Automotive Recalls: A Case of Too Many Backseat 
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by those motorists who would suffer disutility from having their driver behavior 
adversely evaluated by peers.  There would also be some driver distraction costs 
associated with HMDFE.  However, these distraction costs would be offset (perhaps 
fully) by a reduction in two forms of driver distraction: distraction caused by an inability 
to sanction an aggressive driver in a measured way, and distraction caused by reduced 
rubbernecking. 
 In short, the costs and benefits of HMDFE are presently indeterminate and will 
remain so until a pilot program is implemented or further experimental studies are 
conducted.  That said, it seems entirely plausible that the benefits associated with 
HMDFE will outweigh the associated costs, perhaps by a wide margin. 
 
IV. Variations 
 My goal in this paper has been to construct a conceptual case for distributed 
enforcement of traffic norms.  I have no intention of hashing out all the details of what 
the ideal HMDFE system would look like.  After all, for the reasons identified above, 
implementing any HMDFE regime would induce a great many changes in the way we 
think about traffic regulation, and different portfolios of changes are likely to appeal to 
different readers.  Along the same lines, any HMDFE regime necessarily confronts some 
basic tradeoffs, and the ways in which policymakers weigh those tradeoffs should affect 
the parameters of such a system.  For example, there will be a tradeoff between the costs 
of a HMDFE system and its effectiveness in generating accurate data.  So policymakers 
in jurisdictions facing major resource constraints might opt for a less accurate system, 
and policymakers in jurisdictions where collisions impose particularly serious costs on 
society may be willing to stomach a higher tech version of HMDFE.  This part of the 
paper identifies the more important tradeoffs and evaluates possible variations on the 
HMDFE regime.  
A. High Tech Reporting 
 The rudimentary version of HMDFE relies on technologies that already exist and 
have proven themselves in the context of voluntary HMD programs for commercial 
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fleets: stickers or placards on the backs of vehicles encouraging motorists to report 
misconduct via their cell phones.  That said, placards and cell phones should strike us as 
stone age technologies in 2006.  Requiring motorists to see a placard clearly, pay for cell 
phone calls, and report good or bad behavior to an operator will surely deter some 
reporting and thereby keep much useful data out of the system.  So technologies that can 
reduce these reporting costs seem particularly valuable in the context of a HMDFE 
regime.  A slightly higher technology version of the system would lower the cost of 
reporting good or bad driving by installing dedicated communications technologies 
within vehicles for the sole purpose of contacting HMD call centers.  Motorists could 
contact these call centers by pressing a button on their steering wheels and by 
commenting on others’ driving using a built-in speaker.  We can dub this version the 
“On-Star” approach.197 
 But with a little bit of ambition, we can imagine a much more effective HMDFE 
system, using technologies that already exist, but that have not been adapted for the 
purposes of reporting bad or good driving.  This could be accomplished by mandating the 
installation of GPS trackers in every vehicle or using cell phone tower triangulation to 
identify the locations of particular motorists.  Such positional data would allow drivers to 
report on each other’s driving even if they could not see a placard.  For example, a driver 
might contact the call center to report, “Blue convertible behind me, add three points, 
kindly let me merge.”  Relying on voice recognition software to turn this report into 
binary code instantaneously,198 the HMD call center would then use GPS to discover the 
location of the caller’s vehicle as well as the unique identifier belonging to the vehicle 
immediately behind his, assigning that vehicle three driving points after verifying that it 
was a blue convertible.  Indeed, if the vehicle behind the driver at that moment was no 
longer a blue convertible, the automated call center could locate any blue convertible 
within a few car lengths of the caller’s vehicle and assign that car the points in question.  
In principle, such a system also could be designed to facilitate reporting by pedestrians, 
bicyclists, and bus passengers, particularly as GPS-enabled hand held devices become 
increasingly common in the coming years.  Analyzing the various engineering challenges 
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198 Washburn, supra note 86, at 481. 
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inherent in developing such a system is well outside my zone of expertise.  I will merely 
refer interested readers to some of the more illuminating papers in the burgeoning 
literatures on the use of GPS devices in driving,199 wireless communications systems in 
vehicles,200 and voice recognition devices in automobiles.201   
 A different type of high-tech reporting can address the aforementioned inaccurate 
feedback problem as well.  It would be relatively easy to mount digital video cameras on 
the front and rear of all participating vehicles, and in-car computers could upload the 
video footage from the time period immediately preceding a call to a HMDFE call center.  
The images captured by these cameras could provide verification of negative or positive 
feedback reported to the HMDFE call centers.202  It would not be efficient for the state to 
analyze each reported incident independently to see if it was supported by what the 
cameras picked up.  But spot checks to ensure the accuracy of feedback reports could be 
accomplished quite easily, and in cases involving high stakes (i.e., where one driver 
assigns a large number of positive or negative points) evidence from these cameras would 
go along way toward ensuring system accuracy.   
 A high-tech version of HMDFE will be more costly than a low-tech version, but 
the savings associated with a higher-tech version could warrant the added expenditures, 
particularly since automobile industry analysts expect the proliferation of vehicle-based 
speech-recognition and GPS tracking technologies anyway in years to come.   
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B. Decreased Anonymity for Reporters 
 At first glance it may seem strange that a paper that began by bemoaning the ills 
associated with anonymous driving has proposed a system of semi-anonymous feedback.  
On balance, a system where call centers know the identity of a caller but drivers who 
spark a complaint do not seems to strike the best balance among several objectives that 
are at times in tension with one another.  Caller anonymity will incentivize people to 
report others’ misconduct, discourage retaliation, and promote accurate feedback (to the 
extent that a fear of retaliation would discourage people from providing feedback).  On 
the other hand, caller anonymity would decrease transparency for the subjects of 
complaints and would make it more difficult to correct maliciously false negative reports, 
which will diminish the accuracy of feedback somewhat. 
 What underlies the paper’s tentative conclusion that complete anonymity vis a vis 
targets of driving feedback is optimal?  In part, it is a judgment that non-anonymous 
feedback on eBay has manifested a Pollyanna effect, in that participants have an 
incentive to provide positive feedback about transaction partners in order to increase the 
likelihood that their transaction partners will in turn provide favorable feedback about 
them.203  Because of this concern about retaliation, some participants who are not entirely 
satisfied with the performance of a transaction partner leave unduly positive feedback, 
and this marginally erodes the system’s ability to distinguish good vendors from excellent 
ones. 
 In the driving context, we can expect to see a similar effect if anonymity is not 
protected.  Namely, A may forego providing negative feedback about B’s driving based 
on a concern that B will retaliate against him by providing negative feedback about A.  
This concern could be mitigated, somewhat, by a time lag in revelation, such that A 
would be long gone by the time B learned of A’s feedback.  But this feature would not 
ameliorate the concern entirely in a low tech version of HMDFE since B might have 
made note of the A’s unique identifier if he thought there was some risk that B’s driving 
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would provoke a negative response from A.  Because of these concerns about retaliation, 
too few people would supply the public good that driving feedback represents. 
 This concern is even more pronounced in the aggressive driving context than in 
the eBay context for a couple of reasons.  First, the likelihood of violent retaliation is 
higher in the driving context.  Second, with aggressive drivers, we are talking about a 
population that is prone to aggressive and retaliatory acts in many other facets of their 
lives.204  Many aggressive drivers, in short, will tend to behave vindictively in an 
environment where negative feedback hits them in the pocketbooks, and for that reason 
protecting anonymity to some degree seems essential.  Of course, callers should not be 
entitled to remain anonymous with respect to HMD call centers, even though this lack of 
anonymity will no doubt deter some callers from providing feedback.  If callers are 
permitted to leave completely anonymous reports, then HMD centers can do nothing to 
ensure that a few drivers are not providing too much feedback, that some drivers are not 
targeting other drivers with repeated negative or positive feedback, and that racial or 
other biases are not prompting particular callers to leave inaccurate feedback.205  System 
integrity, in short, demands that callers be accountable to the government, although not 
directly to the targets of their complaints.   
C. Points Only, or Comments as Well? 
 One appealing aspect of an HMD system is its potential to educate drivers who 
are oblivious about their shortcomings.206  Experimental interventions in the driving 
context suggest that when drivers are provided with feedback regarding safety 
performance from passengers in the vehicle, they are responsive to this feedback and 
drive more safely in the future.207  In the commercial fleet setting, fleet operators obtain 
the details of incident reports and use these details to train drivers in how to avoid 
repeating the same mistakes in the future.  This raises the design question of whether 
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HMDFE feedback for everyone should include substantive comments about driving, or 
whether the system should just report final results like +2 points or -1 point for a 
particular incident.  There is not an obviously right answer to this question.  Comments 
can educate or inflame.  Some comments will be perceived by the targets of these 
complaints to be so unfounded that they may erode support for the HMDFE scheme.  On 
the other hand, some motorists may be frustrated by the absence of substantive feedback, 
especially if they routinely receive low marks from fellow drivers but cannot discern the 
basis for that pattern.  Indeed, substantive feedback on eBay seems successful, and helps 
interested participants identify the reasoning behind negative or positive vendor reviews. 
In the driving context, some feedback is particularly valued and valuable. 
Separate surveys of both commercial fleet drivers and senior citizen motorists revealed a 
similar dynamic: Drivers were quite receptive toward feedback about their driving 
received from people with perceived expertise.  More precisely, commercial fleet drivers 
were quite welcoming of performance feedback from their company’s safety managers 
and supervisors, as well as feedback from fellow drivers of commercial fleet vehicles.208  
They were not receptive, by contrast, to feedback from drivers of passenger vehicles.209  
Senior citizens were responsive to feedback from driving instructors, but grew somewhat 
defensive when receiving feedback from people with no apparent expertise in driving-
related matters.210  Let us assume this principal finding is broadly generalizable.  Is there 
a way to raise the quality of substantive feedback in a HMDFE system by identifying the 
relevant experts? 
 The ideal HMDFE system would collect substantive feedback from all drivers, 
but only report that feedback from those drivers with the most favorable HMD scores.  In 
other words, the drivers who received a relatively large number of positive points and a 
relatively small number of negative points from fellow motorists would be free to 
transmit substantive feedback (e.g., “changes lanes too frequently”) to other drivers, 
whereas average and below-average drivers would only have the outcomes of their 
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feedback (e.g., “add 1 point”; “subtract 2 points”) reported to others.  Under such a 
system, those drivers ranking in the top quartile of positive reviews would be entitled to 
leave substantive feedback that other drivers could hear; all other drivers would be 
muzzled.  As a result, when drivers did receive substantive feedback about their driving, 
it would be from drivers whom the system identified as possessing some expertise about 
how to drive in an effective manner.   
 There are additional benefits associated with such a regime.  It is likely that the 
drivers ranked in the top quartile will be relatively courteous in their interactions with 
fellow motorists.  Courteous drivers seem likely to provide relatively constructive 
feedback to other motorists, so limiting this substantive feedback to a select few drivers 
should also help ensure that motorists rarely hear inflammatory, expletive-laced feedback 
about their own driving.211  Moreover, it is possible that motorists will value the 
expressive benefits associated with being a highly-ranked driver.  If so, enabling the top 
ranked drivers to leave verbal feedback will create greater incentives for motorists to 
drive in a manner that wins points from their anonymous peers. 
 Finally, collecting substantive comments in addition to points could serve an 
important educational function for drivers.  Once all the HMDFE feedback is collected, it 
would be relatively easy for the state to publish data on which driving behaviors sparked 
the most compliments and complaints.  Motorists might be surprised to see, say, that 
tailgating annoyed many drivers and that rolling stops did not, or that stealing parking 
spots prompted very intense reactions, whereas moderate speeding prompted only mild 
annoyance.  Motorists who perused this data could adjust their own driving behaviors 
accordingly in subsequent periods.  The publication of such data would help satisfy some 
due-process oriented concerns about citizen notice of the rules of the road.  Moreover, it 
would enable jurisdictions and insurers to monitor changes in driving norms over time.  
The primary benefit, though, of using information aggregation technologies in this 
context would be the creation of a parallel traffic code, one that approximated actual 
motorists’ preferences and behaviors as closely as possible.  HMDFE thus emerges as a 
system that is capable of enforcing existing norms, but also becomes a system that can 
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allow the state to identify emerging social norms.  These norms can then be publicized to 
members of the public, perhaps hastening the process by which they become efficient 
focal points for human behavior.212  
 Having described the trees, a few words about this forest are in order.  The 
foregoing analysis suggests the potential for HMDFE to produce, as a by-product, a 
universal and comprehensive driving code that perfectly reflects the preferences of 
American drivers and is capable of changing on a dime in response to preference shifts.  
We might conceptualize such a code as the product of hyperdemocratic decisionmaking.  
It certainly makes other forms of direct democracy, like the initiative process, look 
republican and clunky in comparison.  Unlike any other law on the books, such a law 
would provide citizens with precise notice of the rules of the road as enforced.  That is 
something no other sort of law presently does.   
D. One Car, One Vote? 
 This discussion of differential feedback abilities brings to mind a further 
programmatic variation.  To date, the discussion has assumed that the feedback structure 
would permit something like cumulative voting.  Under such a scheme, each driver might 
be allotted fifteen positive points and fifteen negative points each month, which could be 
assigned to thirty different vehicles or two different vehicles, depending on the intensity 
of the driver’s reaction to another drivers’ conduct.  All along, the discussion has 
assumed something along the lines of one car, one vote.   
 It may be that an optimal system would involve deviations from this system.  For 
example, the system probably should allot more points to motorists who spend more of 
their time on the roadways, and miles driven would be an adequate proxy for this.  
Similarly, motorists who receive very positive marks from their peers could be allotted 
extra points each month, or could have their points weighted more heavily than those 
                                                                                                                                                 
211 Grey et al., supra note 18, at 49 (describing the drivers with the fewest lifetime accidents as being 
unusually relaxed and cool headed when confronted by others’ rude driving). 
212 On the effect of focal points and the law’s expressive effects, see Richard H. McAdams, A Focal 
Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, 
Testing the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance: The Effect of Third-Party Expression in an 
Experimental Hawk / Dove Game, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 87 (2005). 
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who receive middling or poor feedback.213  Indeed, the system might well ignore the 
feedback provided by the worst drivers, since those drivers could be penalizing driving 
behavior that the vast majority of motorists regard as safe and cooperative.214   
 Even if the HMDFE system adhered to a one car, one vote principle, insurance 
companies might still be able to obtain some of the gains associated with deviations from 
that principle.  If the raw data from HMDFE is shared with insurers, then insurance 
companies could test various voting models and try to better predict risks.  Actuaries thus 
could function as lab technicians, constantly tinkering with new models for weighing 
feedback, and the government eventually could piggy back on this work, adopting the 
weighting algorithms that proved most successful in the private insurance market. 
 This discussion of some of the variations and design issues that would arise in 
implementation of a HMDFE regime reveals how much the regime can accomplish and 
how much rides on the details.  Other details of the program, such as the optimal voting 
scheme, seem open to reasoned debate.215      
V. “How’s My Driving?” for Everything? 
 In a standard thought paper, a concluding section discusses the various ways in 
which the model proposed might be extended to other settings.  There is some 
awkwardness in writing that section of this paper.  After all, my proposal itself extends 
two related ideas – commercial fleet HMD programs and eBay-style electronic reputation 
tracking – to a much larger arena.  Nevertheless, we can conceptualize this paper’s 
                                                 
213 Cf. Yu & Singh, supra note 141, at 158 (advocating the implementation of such a system for online 
reputation tracking systems). 
214 There is, of course, some circularity built into a system that allots extra votes to the top-ranked 
drivers and fewer votes to the bottom-ranked drivers.  This circularity is easily avoided, however, if 
rankings at a fixed point (say, the beginning of each month or year) are used to weight votes.  Alternatively, 
the system can rely on raw scores (i.e., the results of a one car, one vote system) to rank for the purposes of 
determining how many votes each driver is allotted, and adjusted scores thereafter. 
215 Because of space considerations, I will spare the reader extended discussions of other variations, 
such as the decision as to whether cumulative feedback scores should be visible on the exterior of vehicles 
(a point about which I am agnostic), or whether HMDFE should replace voluntary feedback with a market 
regime, whereby motorists would obtain financial bonuses for providing negative feedback about a 
motorist who was subsequently involved in an accident or for providing positive feedback about a motorist 
who maintained a clean driving record during the next year (a variation that I would regard as undesirable), 
or whether citizens ought to be able to go “double or nothing” when negative feedback about them is 
logged, permitting them to avoid penalties for negative feedback if they receive no similar negative 
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proposal as a new paradigm for the enforcement of societal rules.  In public spaces where 
social norms are reasonably well developed and universal, and where policing by 
government agents is inherently problematic, we can rely heavily on citizens themselves 
to police misconduct.     
 As this paper suggested earlier,216 work by social norms scholars has suggested 
that efficient citizen enforcement can happen naturally in close knit groups, where repeat 
player interactions are common, information pertinent to social control flows easily, and 
relations among actors are somewhat multiplex and not too hierarchical.217  But in 
environments where those conditions do not hold, i.e., among loose-knit groups, social 
order sometimes breaks down, necessitating a substantial police presence.  The idea 
behind this paper is to use technology to transform loose-knit environments into close-
knit environments, so that the police presence can be curtailed substantially without 
compromising safety.  These schemes therefore replace state policing with citizen 
policing, laws with norms, and, to some extent, rules with standards.  In thinking about 
extensions of the approach, then, it makes sense to think about other loose-knit 
environments where social order sometimes breaks down. 
 At the same time, there will be social settings in which technologically aided 
norm enforcement is undesirable.  I am thinking, in particular, of those settings in which 
conformity is bad and majoritarian norms are invasive.  For example, we would recoil at 
the thought of “How’s My Speech?” being used to sanction political dissidents.  When 
political dissent is at issue, society has long recognized the value in letting unpopular or 
unfashionable arguments be voiced.  Similarly, using “How’s My Art?” to award 
National Endowment for the Arts grants could well reward those artists whose work was 
not artistically excellent but coincided with the aesthetic preferences of the median voter.  
And, in a different vein, we must recognize the problems that would arise if we tried to 
use a “How’s My Driving?” for Everything approach to deal with matters about which 
preferences are very idiosyncratic.  For example, such technologies could take some of 
                                                                                                                                                 
feedback during the next year or two, but applying a multiplier to the fine if they receive similar feedback 
in the near future (a variation that seems appealing). 
216 See supra text accompanying notes 103-105. 
217 ELLICKSON, supra note 103, at 180-81 (1991). 
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the risk out of blind dates,218 but romantic tastes are certainly variable enough to warrant 
skepticism about the approach, and hurt feelings may prompt people to leave inaccurate 
feedback following instances of unreciprocated attraction.  Indeed, for these reasons, 
online dating web sites that have incorporated reviews and references do not seem to 
have been particularly successful.219  In short, when the very high emotional stakes 
associated with dating are combined with highly individuated preferences, the false 
feedback problem becomes almost insurmountable. 
 There will be other settings in which conformity is relatively uncontroversial and 
median voter instincts are sensible but the costs of using HMD technologies to police 
misconduct exceed the benefits.  Take pedestrian activity in public spaces.  Interactions 
among pedestrians on a sidewalk, at a block party, or outside a concert venue are usually 
reasonably orderly for a variety of reasons: people interact with others face to face, 
people may be accompanied by a few acquaintances amidst the crowd, people may fear 
police intervention or mob justice if they act boorishly, and many people have 
internalized norms that cause them to behave in a considerate fashion.  In a science-
fiction world, we can imagine a “How’s My Walking?” for Everyone system that 
eliminates anonymity in public spaces.220  Were we to hand people remote controls and 
let them play a reputational version of laser tag, where their point totals would be posted 
on the Internet for employers, parents, blind dates, and parole officers to see, public 
misconduct would be deterred substantially. This regime would be one in which 
obscurity in public spaces disappeared entirely, but at what cost?.  Such a regime only 
would be appropriate in those environments where public misconduct has reached crisis 
levels.  
In looking for successful applications of “How’s My Driving?” for everything, 
then, we should seek out contexts in which conformity is unproblematic, median voter 
                                                 
218 How’s My Kissing? 
219 See Anna Jane Grossman, Honestly Online: Internet Dating Becomes Less of a Crapshoot When 
You can Pre-Screen Your Potential Date, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 4, 2005, at 32. 
220 This is no longer science fiction.  Science non-fiction is more like it.  As you read these words, 
engineers are developing wearable computers that will facilitate face-to-face interactions when proximate 
strangers’ devices reveal mutual interests, acquaintances, or social aspirations.  Scholars have already 
begun thinking about how wearable communities can incorporate reputation and feedback.  See Gerd 
Kortuem & Zary Segall, Wearable Communities: Augmenting Social Networks with Wearable Computers, 
2 IEEE PERVASIVE COMPUTING 71, 77 (2003); Schneider et al., supra note 145, at 245-47.   
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judgments are informative, a broad social consensus exists regarding appropriate 
behavior, and the benefits of reputation tracking exceed the costs.  For illustrative 
purposes, we can begin with a context where the disorder resulting from anonymity is not 
severe, but for which the costs of implementing a reputation tracking system would be so 
low as to render an intervention plausibly worthwhile.  The vast majority of hotel guests 
are perfectly cooperative, desiring little more than a clean room and a good night’s sleep.  
But most readers have probably had the misfortune to be assigned a room next door to 
inconsiderate outliers on multiple occasions.  Many people, being essentially 
nonconfrontational, simply endure the noise.  Others bang on walls or ask the front-desk 
employees to intervene, sometimes with minimal success.  The problem, of course, is that 
hotels cannot identify the noisy patrons in advance, and customers are given no 
opportunities to choose their neighbors.  It is not difficult to imagine a straightforward 
“How’s My Neighboring?” program for hotel guests, which would enable hotels to 
exclude the noisy (or confine them to a particularly well insulated portion of the hotel) 
and allow everyone else to enjoy a decent night’s sleep.  The idea, then, is to make 
reputations for noisiness transportable across hotels.  More controversially, we can 
imagine the application of HMDFE variations to public policy issues large (facilitating 
the accurate reporting of parental abuse and neglect of their children) and small 
(permitting the sanctioning of neighbors who leave their trash cans at the curbside for too 
long after pickup day).  Without exploring all these variations, we should turn our 
attention to three settings in which these reputation systems seem particularly promising. 
 The first is military operations.  I am not talking about trench warfare here or 
hand-to-hand combat.  Increasingly, members of the military are called upon to engage in 
peace-keeping operations where aggravating the local population is detrimental to 
mission objectives.  Law-abiding Iraqis are constantly witnessing some American 
soldiers behaving well and a few behaving quite badly.  Yet there is no systematic effort 
to harness this information in a way that might improve military training and conduct.  
Now, there is an obvious challenge here.  We do not want insurgents rating G.I.s, because 
they will probably phone in complaints about the most competent soldiers.  But if the 
law-abiding population outnumbers the insurgent population by a sufficient margin, and 
if reporting on the quality of individual solders is made easy enough, then this problem 
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can be solved.  And of course it may well be that creating this highly visible form of 
accountability creates extraordinary good will among the occupied.   
 The same arguments hold true in the context of police officers, and “How’s My 
Policing?” programs in high-crime areas might be a promising strategy.221  Again, we do 
not particularly want criminals complaining about cops, but if there is a way to encourage 
ordinary citizens to lodge compliments and complaints about particular officers in a low-
cost way, then the benefits would be substantial.  Opportunities to do this exist in the 
present system.  A citizen can jot down a badge number and call a precinct or write a 
letter to a police commissioner.  But the costs of doing so are rather high, and the lack of 
a visible and regular process for leaving feedback surely deters people from providing 
police departments with valuable information that could be used to improve policing.    
 There is a third type of environment in which reputation tracking and feedback 
systems may be particularly advantageous.  It is an environment that is hard to describe, 
however, because it does not yet exist.  As discussed in the paragraphs above, “How’s 
My Driving?” for Everything may prove successful when a well-developed set of norms 
already exists.  But recall the preceding discussion of how HMD programs might also 
permit us to create a “traffic code” that can be updated to reflect real-time changes in 
drivers’ preferences and behaviors.222  On this model, we can use “How’s My Driving?” 
for Everything to create hyper-democratic rules in new environments characterized by 
loose-knit interactions.  Surveying the past decade or so, scores of new environments like 
this have sprouted up, mostly in cyberspace: Internet chat rooms, online poker 
tournaments, peer-to-peer file swapping networks, massively multi-user online games, 
Craig’s List, comments sections on blogs, and many more.  The designers of these new 
environments often have to guess about what types of rules to impose on their users, and 
mistakes will be inevitable.  Harnessing technologies that let anonymous users to rate 
each other’s behavior and explain the basis for their high or low ratings will often be a 
highly beneficial means of giving users the types of rules they want and galvanizing user 
opinion around desirable innovations.  Nobody knows what new loose-knit environments 
                                                 
221 See Terence C. Gill, Note, Regulating the Police in Investigatory Stops: A Practical Alternative to 
Bright Line Rules, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 183, 200 (1985) (mentioning such a regime). 
222 See supra text accompanying note 212.  
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will emerge in the coming decades.  But we have enough information to suspect that in 
the new environments that do emerge, “How’s My Driving?” for Everything technologies 
stand poised to help create and enforce the norms that will regulate behavior therein.  
VI. Conclusion 
 The regime advanced in this paper represents a re-thinking of the way that we 
currently regulate traffic.  It examines the costs of anonymous driving and finds them to 
be quite substantial, resulting in aggressive and unsafe behavior that kills thousands of 
Americans each year and makes tens of millions of commuters miserable.  Although 
anonymous driving has become a fundamental fact of urban, suburban, and exurban 
driving environments, this anonymity can be curtailed.  Indeed, urban driver anonymity 
seems like a relic from a bygone era, out of place in the information age.  Just as eBay’s 
reputation tracking system tamed e-commerce fraud rather effectively, “How’s My 
Driving?” for Everyone might rein in aggressive, inconsiderate, and unsafe driving.   
 “How’s My Driving?” programs appear to improve commercial fleet accident 
rates substantially, although more research on this front is certainly warranted.  Assuming 
that further study confirms the very promising initial industry data, the state should 
strongly consider extending these programs to passenger vehicles, and there are strong 
reasons to favor universality within a given jurisdiction.  At any given moment, there are 
millions of American drivers who are watching their fellow motorists behave badly.  
Many of these drivers mutter to themselves about their peers’ misconduct, growing 
increasingly frustrated with their driving experience.  At times, this frustration boils over 
into extreme acts of road rage.  These opinions are formed, the information exists, and it 
is being vocalized to passengers or to no one in particular.  All the government needs to 
do is harness this information.  In so doing, the government would be delegating 
substantial traffic regulation duties to its drivers, in one fell swoop eliminating the need 
for vast numbers of traffic police, enabling insurers to price automobile premiums in a 
more individuated, less discriminatory manner, and quite possibly, making urban driving 
fun again.  
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